Jordan Forex Market

The mon (文 ?) was a currency of Japan from Muromachi period until 1870. The Chinese character for mon is 文 and the character for currency was widely used in the Chinese-character cultural sphere, eg. Chinese wen and Korean mun. Coins denominated in mon were cast in copper or iron and circulated alongside silver and gold ingots denominated in shu, bu and ryō, with 16 shu = 4 bu = 1 ryo. The yen replaced these denominations in 1870. However, its usage continued at least into 1871, as the first Japanese stamps, issued in that year, were denominated in mon.[1]

History
Mon coins were holed, allowing them to be strung together on a piece of string.
In 1695, the shogunate placed the Japanese character gen (元) on the obverse of copper coins.[2]
Through Japanese history, there were many different styles of currency of many shapes, styles, designs, sizes and materials, including gold, silver, bronze, etc. Even rice was once a currency, the koku.

Japan Gold Market

Japan has evolved as a major market for gold for fabrication and investment since trading was liberalised in 1974. But the gold business in Japan has much earlier origins. Gold mines in Japan in the 17th century exported through the Dutch East India Company to East Asian countries. Tokuriki Honten, still an important refiner and fabricator, traces its history back to 1727. Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo, the leading precious metal refiner and trader, was established in 1885.
Actual mine production is limited. The only significant mine is Sumitomo Metal Mining's Hishikari on Kyushu island, opened in 1985, with output between seven and eight tonnes (0.25-0.26 million oz) annually. The Japanese market is supplied, therefore, both by imports of bullion and by-product gold from imported concentrates.

Total gold demand in Japan ranges between 200 and 275 tonnes (6.4 – 8.8 million oz), embracing jewellery fabrication, electronic and industrial uses, dental applications and physical bar investment . Japan is the world's foremost user in electronics, using over 100 tonnes (3.21 million oz) in 2000 according to GFMS (although this fell sharply, to around 70 tonnes or 2.25 million oz, in 2001 on the back of the slowdown in global demand). Japan's use of dental gold in 2001 was around 21 tonnes (675,000 oz) according to GFMS. Physical bar hoarding is also much higher than in other industrial countries, and is an anonymous way of holding wealth outside of the banking sector. GFMS estimate that it averaged just under 60 tonnes (1.9 million oz) over the past decade and exceeding 100 tonnes (13.2 million oz) in 1999. The first few months of 2002 saw a surge in Japanese hoarding demand due to fears about the health of the banking system.
It is also the custom in Japan for companies to give gifts of 24 carat ornaments such as teapots, saki cups, vases and chopsticks. The gold tea ceremony room at the Moa Art Museum in Shizuoka Province used 50 kilos (1,607 oz) for teapots and cups, plus gold leaf for its walls.

Germany Forex Market

The Deutsche Mark (DEM, DM) or German mark was the officialcurrency of West Germany and, from 1990 until the adoption of theeuro, all of unified Germany. It was first issued under Allied occupation in 1948 replacing the Reichsmark, and served as theFederal Republic of Germany's official currency from its founding the following year until 1999, when the Mark was replaced by the euro; itscoins and banknotes remained in circulation, defined in terms of euros, until the introduction of euro notes and coins in early 2002. The Deutsche Mark ceased to be legal tender immediately upon the introduction of the euro—in contrast to the other eurozone nations, where the euro and legacy currency circulated side by side for up to two months. However, DM coins and banknotes continued to be accepted as valid forms of payment in Germany until 28 February 2002.The Deutsche Bundesbank has guaranteed that all DM in cash form may be changed into euros indefinitely, and one may do so at any branch of the Bundesbank and banks worldwide. From time to time, some merchants hold promotions where Deutsche Marks are accepted as payment.On 31 December 1998, the European Central Bank (ECB) fixed the irrevocable exchange rate, effective 1 January 1999, for DM to euroas DM 1.95583 = one euro.[1]One Deutsche Mark was divided into 100 Pfennig.

Germany Gold Market

Background
Gold, recognizable by its yellowish cast, is one of the oldest metals used by humans. As far back as the Neolithic period, humans have collected gold from stream beds, and the actual mining of gold can be traced as far back as 3500 B.C., when early Egyptians (the Sumerian culture of Mesopotamia) used mined gold to craft elaborate jewelry, religious artifacts, and utensils such as goblets.
Gold's aesthetic properties combined with its physical properties have long made it a valuable metal. Throughout history, gold has often been the cause of both conflict and adventure: the destruction of both the Aztec and Inca civilizations, for instance, and the early American gold rushes to Georgia, California, and Alaska.
The largest deposit of gold can be found in South Africa in the Precambrian Witwatersrand Conglomerate. This deposit of gold ore is hundreds of miles across and more than two miles deep. It is estimated that two-thirds of the gold mined comes from South Africa. Other major producers of gold include Australia, the former Soviet Union, and the United States (Arizona, Colorado, California, Montana, Nevada, South Dakota, and Washington).
About 65 percent of processed gold is used in the arts industry, mainly to make jewelry. Besides jewelry, gold is also used in the electrical, electronic, and ceramics industries. These industrial applications have grown in recent years and now occupy an estimated 25 percent of the gold market. The remaining percentage of mined gold is used to make a type of ruby colored glass called purple of Cassius, which is applied to office building windows to reduce the heat in the summer, and to mirrors used in space and in electroscopy so that they reflect the infrared spectrum.
Physical Characteristics
Gold, whose chemical symbol is Au, is malleable, ductile, and sectile, and its high thermal and electrical conductivity as well as its resistance to oxidation make its uses innumerable. Malleability is the ability of gold and other metals to be pressed or hammered into thin sheets, 10 times as thin as a sheet of paper. These sheets are sometimes evaporated onto glass for infrared reflectivity, molded as fillings for teeth, or used as a coating or plating for parts. Gold's ability to be drawn into thin wire (ductility) enables it to be deposited onto circuits such as transistors and to be used as an industrial solder and brazing alloy. For example, gold wire is often used for integrated circuit electrical connections, for orthodontic and prosthetic appliances, and in jet engine fabrication.
Gold's one drawback for use in industry is that it is a relatively soft metal (sectile). To combat this weakness, gold is usually alloyed with another member of the metal family such as silver, copper, platinum, or nickel. Gold alloys are measured by karats (carats). A karat is a unit equal to 1/24 part of pure gold in an alloy. Thus, 24 karat (24K) gold is pure gold, while 18 karat gold is 18 parts pure gold to 6 parts other metal.
Extraction and Refining
Gold is usually found in a pure state; however, it can also be extracted from silver, copper, lead and zinc. Seawater can also contain gold, but in insufficient quantities to be profitably extracted—up to one-fortieth (1/40) of a grain of gold per ton of water. Gold is generally found in two types of deposits: lode (vein) or placer deposits; the mining technique used to extract the gold depends upon the type of deposit. Once extracted, the gold is refined with one of four main processes: floatation, amalgamation, cyanidation, or carbon-in-pulp. Each process relies on the initial grinding of the gold ore, and more than one process may be used on the same batch of gold ore.
Mining
In lode or vein deposits, the gold is mixed with another mineral, often quartz, in a vein that has filled a split in the surrounding rocks. Gold is obtained from lode deposits by drilling, blasting, or shoveling the surrounding rock.
Lode deposits often run deep underground. To mine underground, miners dig shafts into the ground along the vein. Using picks and small explosives, they then remove the gold ore from the surrounding rock. The gold ore is then gathered up and taken to a mill for refinement.
Placer deposits contain large pieces of gold ore (nuggets) and grains of gold that have been washed downstream from a lode deposit and that are usually mixed with sand or gravel. The three main methods used to mine placer deposits are hydraulic mining, dredging, and power shoveling. All methods of placer deposit mining use gravity as the basic sorting force.
In the first method, a machine called a "hydraulic giant" uses a high pressure stream of water to knock the gold ore off of banks containing the ore. The gold ore is then washed down into sluices or troughs that have grooves to catch the gold.
Dredging and power shoveling involve the same techniques but work with different size buckets or shovels. In dredging, buckets on a conveyor line scoop sand, gravel, and gold ore from the bottom of streams. In power shoveling, huge machines act like shovels and scoop up large quantities of gold-bearing sand and gravel from stream beds.
Hydraulic mining and dredging are outlawed in many countries because they are environmentally destructive to both land and streams.
Grinding
Once the gold ore has been mined, it usually is washed and filtered at the mine as a preliminary refinement technique. It is then shipped to mills, where it is first combined with water and ground into smaller chunks. The resulting mixture is then further ground in a ball mill—a rotating cylindrical vessel that uses steel balls to pulverize the ore.
Separating the gold from the ore
The gold is then separated from the ore using one of several methods. Floatation involves the separation of gold from its ore by using certain chemicals and air. The finely ground ore is dumped into a solution that contains a frothing agent (which causes the water to foam), a collecting agent (which bonds onto the gold, forming an oily film that sticks to air bubbles), and a mixture of organic chemicals (which keep the other contaminants from also bonding to the air bubbles). The solution is then aerated—air bubbles are blown in—and the gold attaches to the air bubbles. The bubbles float to the top, and the gold is skimmed off.
Cyanidation also involves using chemicals to separate the gold from its contaminants. In this process, the ground ore is placed in a tank containing a weak solution of cyanide. Next, zinc is added to the tank, causing a chemical reaction in which the end result is the precipitation (separation) of the gold from its ore. The gold precipitate is then separated from the cyanide solution in a filter press. A similar method is amalgamation, which uses the same process with different chemicals. First, a solution carries the ground ore over plates covered with mercury. The mercury attracts the gold, forming an alloy called an amalgam. The amalgam is then heated, causing the mercury to boil off as a gas and leaving behind the gold. The mercury is collected, recycled and used again in the same process.
The carbon-in-pulp method also uses cyanide, but utilizes carbon instead of zinc to precipitate the gold. The first step is to mix the ground ore with water to form a pulp. Next, cyanide is added to dissolve the gold, and then carbon is added to bond with the gold. After the carbon particles are removed from the pulp, they are placed in a hot caustic (corrosive) carbon solution, which separates the gold from the carbon.
If the gold is still not pure enough, it can be smelted. Smelting involves heating the gold with a chemical substance called flux. The flux bonds with the contaminants and floats on top of the melted gold. The gold is then cooled and allowed to harden in molds, and the flux-contaminant mixture (slag) is hauled away as a solid waste.
The Future
Because gold is a finite resource, its long-term future is limited. In the short term, however, it will continue to find widespread use in jewelry and in industrial applications, especially in the electronics field.
In the last few years, several companies have focused on extracting gold from sulphide ore rather than oxide ore. Previous techniques made such extraction difficult and expensive, but a newer technique called bioleaching has made extraction more feasible. The process involves combining the sulphide ore with special bacteria that "eat" the ore or break it down into a more manageable form.
Where To Learn More
Books
Coombs, Charles. Gold and Other Precious Metals. Morrow Publishing, 1981.
Gasparrini, Claudia. Gold & Other Precious Metals: From Ore to Market. Springer-Verlag, 1993.
Green, Timothy. The World of Gold. Walker Publishing, 1968.
Hawkins, Clint. Gold & Lead. HarperCollins, 1993.
Lye, Keith. Spotlight on Gold. Rourke Enterprises, 1988.
McCracken, Dave. Gold Mining in the Nineteen Nineties: The Complete Book of Modern Gold Mining Procedure. New Era Publications, 1993.
Wise, Edmund, ed. Gold: Recovery, Properties, and Applications. Van Nostrand, 1964.
Periodicals
Abelson, Philip H. "Gold." Science. July 11, 1986, p. 141.
Dworetzky, Tom. "Gold Bugs." Discover, March, 1988, p. 32.
"Some Like It Hot." Economist. June 25, 1988, p.88.
"Mining with Microbes: A Labor of Bug." Science News. April 14, 1990, p. 236.
[Article by: Alicia Haley and; Blaine Danley]
Sponsored Links
4 Top Gold Stocks of 2009Discover how to get rich investing in gold. Free report reveals how... www.SmartProfitsReport.com/Gold2009
Gold BarsQuickly search merchant prices. 100,000 Stores. Deals. Reviews. shopping.yahoo.com
Sci-Tech Encyclopedia: Gold Top
Home > Library > Science > Sci-Tech Encyclopedia
A chemical element, Au, atomic number 79 and atomic weight 196.967, a deep yellow, soft, and very dense metal. Gold is classed as a heavy metal and as a noble metal; commercially, it is the most familiar of the precious metals. Copper, silver, and gold are in the same group of the periodic table of elements. The Latin name for gold, aurum (glowing dawn), is the source of the chemical symbol Au. There is only one stable isotope of gold, that of mass number 197. See also Periodic table.
Uses
Consumption of gold in jewelry accounts for about three-fourths of the world's production of gold. Industrial applications, especially electronic, consume another 10–15%. The remainder is divided among medical and dental uses, coinage, and bar stock for governmental and private holdings. Gold coins and most decorative gold objects are actually gold alloys, because the metal itself is too soft (2.5–3 on Mohs scale) to be useful with frequent handling.
Radioactive 198Au is used in medical irradiation, in diagnosis, and in a number of industrial applications as a tracer. Another tracer use is in the study of movement of sediment on the ocean floor in and around harbors. The properties of gold toward radiant energy have led to development of efficient energy reflectors for infrared heaters and cookers and for focusing and retention of heat in industrial processes.
Occurrence
Gold occurs widely throughout the world, but usually very sparsely, so that it is quite a rare element. Sea water contains low concentrations of gold, on the order of 10 μg per ton (10 parts of gold per trillion parts of water). Somewhat higher concentrations accumulate on plankton or on the ocean bottom. At present, no economically feasible process is visualized for extracting gold from the sea. Native, or metallic, gold and various telluride minerals are the only forms of gold found on land. Native gold may occur in veins among rocks and ores of other metals, especially quartz or pyrite, or it may be scattered in sands and gravel (alluvial gold).
Properties
The density of gold is 19.3 times that of water at 20°C (68°F), so that 1 ft3 of gold weighs about 1200 lb (1 m3, about 19,000 kg). Masses of gold, like those of other precious metals, are measured on the troy scale, which counts 12 oz to the pound. Gold melts at 1064.43°C (1947.97°F) and boils at 2860°C (5180°F). It is somewhat volatile well below its boiling point. Gold is a good conductor of heat and electricity. It is the most malleable and ductile metal. It can easily be made into translucent sheets 0.0000039 in. (0.00001 mm) thick or drawn into wire weighing only 0.00005 oz/ft (0.5 mg/m). The quality of gold is expressed on the fineness scale as parts of pure gold per thousand parts of total metal, or on the karat scale as parts of pure gold per 24 parts of total metal. Gold readily dissolves in mercury to form amalgams. Gold is one of the least active metals chemically. It does not tarnish or burn in air. It is inert to strong alkaline solutions and to all pure acids except selenic acid.
Compounds
Gold may be either unipositive or tripositive in its compounds. So strong is the tendency for gold to form complexes that all the compounds of the 3+ oxidation state are complex. The compounds of the 1+ oxidation state are not very stable and tend to be oxidized to the 3+ state or reduced to metallic gold. All compounds of either oxidation state are easy to reduce to the metal.
In its complex compounds gold forms bonds most readily and stably with halogens and sulfur, less stably with oxygen and phosphorus, and only weakly with nitrogen. Bonds between gold and carbon are fairly stable, as in the cyanide complexes and a variety of organogold compounds.

Sponsored Links
Investing In Gold 2009Learn How You Can Make a Fortune in the 2009 Gold Boom www.DailyWealth.com/Gold_Report
Buy US Gold Coins2008 American Eagle Gold Coins. from Coast To Coast Coins www.CoastCoin.com
Dental Dictionary: gold Top
Home > Library > Health > Dental Dictionary
n
A precious or noble metal; yellow, malleable, ductible, nonrusting; much used in dentistry in pure and alloyed forms.
Sponsored Links
Gold BarsSearching for Gold Bars? Online listings and info. www.OnlyGoldBars.com
Gold vs. U.S. DollarsHow safe is your money? Free Reports & Info www.goldiras.com
Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: gold Top
Home > Library > Miscellaneous > Britannica Concise Encyclopedia
.content{clear:both;}
Metallic chemical element, one of the transition elements, chemical symbol Au, atomic number 79. It is a dense, lustrous, yellow, malleable precious metal, so durable that it is virtually indestructible, often found uncombined in nature. Jewelry and other decorative objects have been crafted from gold for thousands of years. It has been used for coins, to back paper currencies, and as a reserve asset. Gold is widely distributed in all igneous rocks, usually pure but in low concentrations; its recovery from ores and deposits has been a major preoccupation since ancient times (see cyanide process). The world's gold supply has seen three great leaps, with Christopher Columbus's arrival in the Americas in 1492, with discoveries in California (see gold rush) and Australia (1850 – 75), and discoveries in Alaska, Yukon (see Klondike), and South Africa (1890 – 1915). Pure gold is too soft for prolonged handling; it is usually used in alloys with silver, copper, and other metals. In addition to being used in jewelry and as currency, gold is used in electrical contacts and circuits, as a reflective layer in space applications and on building windows, and in filling and replacing teeth. Dental alloys are about 75% gold, 10% silver. In jewelry, its purity is expressed in 24ths, or karats: 24-karat is pure, 12-karat is 50% gold, etc. Its compounds, in which it has valence 1 or 3, are used mainly in plating and other decorative processes; a soluble chloride compound has been used to treat rheumatoid arthritis.
For more information on gold, visit Britannica.com.
Sponsored Links
Sell Gold Jewelry OnlineAs Seen on TV. Cash in 24 Hrs. Free Shipping. Top Payment Guarantee! www.GoldPaq.com
Gold BarsThe Ultimate Guide to Gold Bars GoldBars-Direct.com
English Folklore: gold Top
Home > Library > Literature & Language > English Folklore
Thought to have healing properties, especially for sore eyes and styes, which should be rubbed with a wedding ring (the only gold object most families were likely to possess). Gold earnings were also thought to strengthen the eyes, and, among sailors and fishermen, to prevent one from drowning. Aubrey says some people of his time tied gold coins to ulcers and fistulas; he wonders whether the cure worked because ‘gold attracts mercury’ or because older gold coins ‘were printed with St Michael the Archangel, and to be stamped according to some Rule Astrological’ (Aubrey, 1688/1880: 206). Similarly, a letter written during the Plague of 1665 advices: ‘Friend, get a piece of angell gold, if you can of Eliz. coine (yt is ye best) wch is phylosophicall gold, and keepe it allways in yor mouth when you walke out or any sicke persons come to you’ (Opie and Tatem, 1989: 175). In such cases, the power resides both in the metal and in the symbolism of its design.For good luck at sea, sailing boats often had a gold sovereign set in the socket under the mast; the custom was common till about 1914, and is still sometimes followed. It has precedents from ancient Rome (Smith, FLS News 26 (1997), p. 12). Lovett found that fishermen from several towns used to ram a coin into the cork float of a drift-net, to break a run of bad luck in fishing, and held that ‘in the old days’ it would have been a gold one (Lovett, 1925: 54-5).

Denmark Forex Market

Forex is a Swedish financial services company. The company was started in 1927 as a currency exchange service for travellers, at the Central Station in Stockholm. The owner of Gyllenspet's Barber Shop, according to the legend, discovered that most of his customers were tourists in need of currency for their trips. So he started keeping the major currencies on hand.The company was subsequently acquired by Statens Järnvägar, the Swedish State Railways, which expanded the operations until it was sold off to one of the managers, Rolf Friberg, in 1965. The company was the only one apart from the banks that was licensed to conduct currency exchange in Sweden.The company, which is still wholly owned by the Friberg family, has expanded into Denmark and Finland and has over 50 shops, usually located at train stations or airports. The decrease in the business brought on by introduction of the Euro has made the company look for alternative sources of revenue, like applying for a banking license and attempting to move into more regular transaction services, earlier handled by the Swedish postal service.

Denmark Gold Market

Denmark Gold Coins 20 Kroner - 1908 KM-810 - 8,96 g Mintage - 0,243M
The obverse has a bareheaded image of King Frederick VIII (b1843-d1912) with a legend identifying him as DENMARK's KING. The reverse has the national coat-of-arms with the date, the denomination, and the mintmaster's initials (VBP).

William Youngerman, Inc.World Gold Coin and U S Gold Coin Specialists
William Youngerman offers live support to answer all your questions about buying-selling-trading World Gold Coins and U S Gold Coins.Boca Raton, Florida is the home to one of the finest World Gold Coin and U S Gold Coin specialists in the United States.
To speak to someone about buying-selling-trading World Gold Coins and U S Gold Coins right now, just pick up the phone and call toll free at 1-800-327-5010.
We have one of the most extensive inventories of World Gold Coins. South Florida has no World Gold Coin specialist to compare. Mr. Youngerman, a World Gold Coin and U S Gold Coin Specialist, is a long standing member of the American Appraisers Association. The World Gold Coins and U S Gold coins in our inventory are certified by either PCGS, NGC or ICG. Mr. Youngerman is available to answer immediate questions about your best advantage regarding buying-selling-trading World Gold Coins and U S Gold Coins.
You can also email Thank you for visiting William Youngerman. And don't forget that we have been leaders in buying-selling-trading World Gold Coins and U S Gold Coins since 1967.
I hope you have a great time buying-selling-trading World Gold Coins and U S Gold Coins!
William YoungermanWilliam Youngerman, Inc.info@williamyoungerman.comToll Free 1-800-327-5010P.S. I enjoy special requests for buying-selling-trading World Gold Coins and U S Gold Coins. Tell me your wants or what you have in World Gold Coins and U S Gold Coins and let's see what we can come up with. I am constantly looking for new avenues for buying-selling-trading World Gold Coins and U S Gold Coins.

Norway Forex Market

OSLO, Sept 24 (Reuters) - Norway's central bank issued the following statement on Wednesday after keeping interest rates steady.
Norges Bank's Executive Board decided today to maintain its key policy rate unchanged at 5.75 per cent.
-- There is now an unusually high degree of uncertainty linked to the turbulence in financial markets. There are wide daily swings in money market rates, equity prices, the krone exchange rate and oil and commodity prices. It is difficult to determine how long this pressure will last and the effects on inflation and activity in the Norwegian economy. It is therefore appropriate to keep the interest rate unchanged now, says Deputy Governor Jan F. Qvigstad.
-- Norges Bank is following developments closely and providing liquidity in both Norwegian kroner and US dollars to curb the swings in the Norwegian money market.
Inflation has picked up markedly since autumn 2007. Underlying inflation now seems to be a little less than 3-1/2 percent. This is higher than expected and well above the inflation target of 2.5 percent. Wages are rising rapidly and productivity growth seems to be slackening faster than previously assumed. At the same time, the krone exchange rate has weakened. There are prospects that inflation may remain high over a period ahead.
On the other hand, the crisis in financial markets has deepened. The risk of a long economic downturn abroad has increased. In Norway, there are also clear signs that economic growth is slowing. At the same time, the difference between money market rates and the key policy rate has widened as a result of the financial market turbulence, and the cost of corporate and household borrowing has increased.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
The Executive Board placed emphasis on the following new information that has emerged since the previous monetary policy meeting on 13 August:
-- The financial market crisis has intensified. In the US, the government has placed the home loan mortgage corporations Fannie Mae (nyse: FNM - news - people ) and Freddie Mac (nyse: FRE - news - people ) into conservatorship. The aim of the conservatorship decision is to stabilise their business operations and return them to normal. The corporations own or guarantee about 40 percent of the US mortgage market. The Federal Reserve has provided the insurance corporation AIG (nyse: AIG - news - people ) with access to a credit line in amounts up to $85 billion over two years. The loan is collateralised by all of the assets of the company. Several large financial institutions have been purchased and the US investment bank Lehman Brothers (nyse: LEH - news - people ) has filed for bankruptcy. In the US, the Department of the Treasury has proposed the establishment of a fund to purchase mortgage-related assets with a high risk of default. The Department of the Treasury has asked Congress to allocate $700 billion to this fund.
-- The three-month money market rate in Norway has varied between 6.5 and 7.0 percent in the past week. Liquidity in the interbank market has at times been very tight. In particular, there is a considerable shortage of US dollar liquidity, especially during European business hours. This has resulted in wide swings and high premiums in short-term interest rates. A number of central banks, including Norges Bank, have provided US dollar liquidity to address the abnormal situation in the money market.
-- The premiums Norwegian financial institutions have to pay on credit market funding have increased further. Norwegian banks' weighted lending rate on new home mortgages with sound collateralisation has increased by close to 0.3 percentage point to almost 7.4 percent.
-- Inflation remains high in many countries, but inflation expectations in the US and Europe have receded somewhat from the high levels prevailing in summer.
-- Growth in the world economy is turning down. In emerging economies, growth is still high, but slowing.
-- Market participants now expect that central bank interest rates will be cut among most of our trading partners. In the US, market participants have priced in an interest rate cut around the turn of the year and interest rate hikes from summer next year. In Sweden, the central bank key rate has been raised.
-- Equity prices have fallen in Norway and abroad. The Oslo Stock Exchange benchmark index has fallen by 9.6 percent.
-- Oil prices fell markedly up to 16 September, but have since risen again. The spot price of Brent blend oil is $101 per barrel. The average futures price for delivery in 2009 is $107 per barrel.
-- The Economist commodity-price index has fallen by 6 percent measured in XDRs, food prices have fallen by 4 percent and the price of fresh salmon by 4 percent, while the price of frozen salmon has risen by 6 percent. Industrial metals prices have fallen by 7 percent measured in XDRs, and the price of aluminium has fallen by 10 percent. Dry cargo freight rates have fallen by 33 percent in XDR terms.
-- The krone exchange rate has depreciated. Volatility in the foreign exchange market has increased markedly. Reduced risk appetite among market participants has contributed to increased krone selling as the krone is considered to be a currency with limited liquidity. The average for the import-weighted krone exchange rate so far in the third quarter is 1.9 percent weaker than in the second quarter. Since the monetary policy meeting in August, the exchange rate has depreciated by 2.4 percent.
-- The year-on-year rise in the consumer price index (CPI) was 4.5 percent in August. Adjusted for tax changes and excluding temporary changes in energy prices (CPIXE), consumer prices rose by 3.4 percent over the past 12 months. Adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE), consumer price inflation was 2.8 percent. Measured by a trimmed mean of the 12-month rise in the sub-indices in the CPI, inflation was 3.6 percent in August, while a weighted median showed a rise of 3.1 percent.
-- In August, seasonally adjusted registered unemployment stood at 1.6 percent of the labour force, unchanged from the previous month. According to Statistics Norway's labour force survey (LFS), seasonally adjusted unemployment was 2.6 percent of the labour force in June (in the three-month period May-July), up from 2.5 percent in the previous month. The labour force expanded by 2000 in the same period, while employment has remained unchanged since April. In August this year, the number of non-nationals with a work permit registered by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration had risen by almost 26,000 compared with the same time last year.
-- According to preliminary quarterly national accounts figures, mainland GDP rose by a seasonally adjusted 0.8 percent from the first half of 2007 to the first half of this year. Excluding taxes, the increase was 1.0 percent, while growth excluding both electricity production and taxes was 1.2 per cent. Growth in labour force productivity has slowed over the past year.

Norway Gold Market

Gold Standard
Lawrence H. Officer, University of Illinois at Chicago
The gold standard is the most famous monetary system that ever existed. The periods in which the gold standard flourished, the groupings of countries under the gold standard, and the dates during which individual countries adhered to this standard are delineated in the first section. Then characteristics of the gold standard (what elements make for a gold standard), the various types of the standard (domestic versus international, coin versus other, legal versus effective), and implications for the money supply of a country on the standard are outlined. The longest section is devoted to the "classical" gold standard, the predominant monetary system that ended in 1914 (when World War I began), followed by a section on the "interwar" gold standard, which operated between the two World Wars (the 1920s and 1930s).
Countries and Dates on the Gold Standard
Countries on the gold standard and the periods (or beginning and ending dates) during which they were on gold are listed in Tables 1 and 2 for the classical and interwar gold standards. Types of gold standard, ambiguities of dates, and individual-country cases are considered in later sections. The country groupings reflect the importance of countries to establishment and maintenance of the standard. Center countries--Britain (since 1801 with legal name "the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland") in the classical standard, the United Kingdom (since 1922 with legal name "the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland") and the United States in the interwar period -- were indispensable to the spread and functioning of the gold standard. Along with the other core countries -- France and Germany, and the United States in the classical period -- they attracted other countries to adopt the gold standard, in particular, British colonies and dominions, Western European countries, and Scandinavia. Other countries -- and, for some purposes, also British colonies and dominions -- were in the periphery: acted on, rather than actors, in the gold-standard eras, and generally not as committed to the gold standard.
Table 1
Countries on Classical Gold Standard
Country
Type of Gold Standard
Period
Center Country
Britaina
Coin
1774-1797b, 1821-1914
Other Core Countries
United Statesc
Coin
1879-1917d
Francee
Coin
1878-1914
Germany
Coin
1871-1914
British Colonies and Dominions
Australia
Coin
1852-1915
Canadaf
Coin
1854-1914
Ceylon
Coin
1901-1914
Indiag
Exchange (British pound)
1898-1914
Western Europe
Austria-Hungaryh
Coin
1892-1914
Belgiumi
Coin
1878-1914
Italy
Coin
1884-1894
Liechtenstein
Coin
1898-1914
Netherlandsj
Coin
1875-1914
Portugalk
Coin
1854-1891
Switzerland
Coin
1878-1914
Scandinavia
Denmarkl
Coin
1872-1914
Finland
Coin
1877-1914
Norway
Coin
1875-1914
Sweden
Coin
1873-1914
Eastern Europe
Bulgaria
Coin
1906-1914
Greece
Coin
1885, 1910-1914
Montenegro
Coin
1911-1914
Romania
Coin
1890-1914
Russia
Coin
1897-1914
Middle East
Egypt
Coin
1885-1914
Turkey (Ottoman Empire)
Coin
1881m-1914
Asia
Japann
Coin
1897-1917
Philippines
Exchange (U.S. dollar)
1903-1914
Siam
Exchange (British pound)
1908-1914
Straits Settlementso
Exchange (British pound)
1906-1914
Mexico and Central America
Costa Rica
Coin
1896-1914
Mexico
Coin
1905-1913
South America
Argentina
Coin
1867-1876, 1883-1885, 1900-1914
Bolivia
Coin
1908-1914
Brazil
Coin
1888-1889, 1906-1914
Chile
Coin
1895-1898
Ecuador
Coin
1898-1914
Peru
Coin
1901-1914
Uruguay
Coin
1876-1914
Africa
Eritrea
Exchange (Italian lira)
1890-1914
German East Africa
Exchange (German mark)
1885p-1914
Italian Somaliland
Exchange (Italian lira)
1889p-1914a Including colonies (except British Honduras) and possessions without a national currency: New Zealand and certain other Oceanic colonies, South Africa, Guernsey, Jersey, Malta, Gibraltar, Cyprus, Bermuda, British West Indies, British Guiana, British Somaliland, Falkland Islands, other South and West African colonies.b Or perhaps 1798.c Including countries and territories with U.S. dollar as exclusive or predominant currency: British Honduras (from 1894), Cuba (from 1898), Dominican Republic (from 1901), Panama (from 1904), Puerto Rico (from 1900), Alaska, Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, Midway Islands (from 1898), Wake Island, Guam, and American Samoa.d Except August – October 1914.e Including Tunisia (from 1891) and all other colonies except Indochina.f Including Newfoundland (from 1895).g Including British East Africa, Uganda, Zanzibar, Mauritius, and Ceylon (to 1901).h Including Montenegro (to 1911).I Including Belgian Congo.j Including Netherlands East Indies.k Including colonies, except Portuguese India.l Including Greenland and Iceland.m Or perhaps 1883.n Including Korea and Taiwan.o Including Borneo.p Approximate beginning date.
Sources: Bloomfield (1959, pp. 13, 15; 1963), Bordo and Kydland (1995), Bordo and Schwartz (1996), Brown (1940, pp.15-16), Bureau of the Mint (1929), de Cecco (1984, p. 59), Ding (1967, pp. 6- 7), Director of the Mint (1913, 1917), Ford (1985, p. 153), Gallarotti (1995, pp. 272 75), Gunasekera (1962), Hawtrey (1950, p. 361), Hershlag (1980, p. 62), Ingram (1971, p. 153), Kemmerer (1916; 1940, pp. 9-10; 1944, p. 39), Kindleberger (1984, pp. 59-60), Lampe (1986, p. 34), MacKay (1946, p. 64), MacLeod (1994, p. 13), Norman (1892, pp. 83-84), Officer (1996, chs. 3 4), Pamuk (2000, p. 217), Powell (1999, p. 14), Rifaat (1935, pp. 47, 54), Shinjo (1962, pp. 81-83), Spalding (1928), Wallich (1950, pp. 32-36), Yeager (1976, p. 298), Young (1925).
Table 2
Countries on Interwar Gold Standard


Country

Type of
Gold Standard
Beginning Date


Ending Date
Exchange-Rate
Stabilization
Currency
Convertibilitya
Center Countries
United Kingdomb
Bullion
1925
1925
1931
United Statesc
Coin
____d
1922e
1933
Other Core Countries
Francef
Bullion
1926
1928
1936
Germany
Exchange
1924
1924
1931
British Colonies and Dominions
Australiag
Coin
1925
1925
1930
British East Africah
Exchange
1925
1925
1931
Canadai
Coin
1925
1926
1929
Ceylon
Exchange
1925
1925
1931
Indiaj
Exchange
1925
1927
1931
New Zealand
Coin
1925
1929k
1930
South Africa
Coin
1925
1925
1933
Western Europe
Austria
Exchange
1922
1923
1931
Belgiuml
Exchange
1926
1926
1935
Danzig
Exchange
1925
1925
1935
Ireland
Coin
1925
1925
1931
Italym
Exchange
1927
1928
1934
Netherlandsn
Coin
1925
1925
1936
Portugalo
Exchange
1929
1931
1931
Switzerlandp
Coin
1925
1925
1936
Scandinavia
Denmarkq
Bullion
1926
1927
1931
Finland
Exchange
1925
1925
1931
Norway
Bullion
1928
1928
1931
Sweden
Coin
1922
1924
1931
Eastern Europe
Albania
Exchange
1922
1925
1939
Bulgaria
Exchange
1924
1927
1931
Czechoslovakia
Exchange
1923
1929
1931
Estonia
Exchange
1925
1928
1931
Greece
Exchange
1927
1928
1932
Hungary
Exchange
1925
1925
1931
Latvia
Exchange
1922
1922
1931
Lithuania
Coin
1922
1922
1935
Poland
Exchange
1926
1927
1936
Romania
Exchange
1927
1929
1932
Yugoslavia
Exchange
1925
1931
1932
Middle East
Egypt
Exchange
1925
1925
1931
Iraq
Exchange
1925
1925
1931
Palestine
Exchange
1927
1927
1931
Syriar
Exchange
1926
1928
1936
Asia
Japans
Coin
1930
1930
1931
Malayat
Exchange
1925
1925
1931
Neth. East Indies
Coin
1925
1925
1936
Philippines
Exchange
1922
1933
1933
Siam
Exchange
1925
1928
1932
Mexico and Central America
Costa Rica
Exchange
1922
1922
1932
Guatemala
Exchange
1925
1926
1933
Haiti
Exchange
1922
1922
1933
Honduras
Exchange
1923
1931
1933
Mexico
Coin
1921
1925
1931
Nicaragua
Exchange
1915
1922
1932
Salvador
Coin
1920
1920
1931
South America
Argentina
Coin
1927
1927
1929
Bolivia
Exchange
1926
1929
1931
Brazil
Exchange
1927
1928
1929
Chile
Exchange
1925
1926
1931
Colombia
Coin
1924
1923
1932
Ecuador
Exchange
1927
1927
1932
Paraguay
Exchange
1927
1927
1929
Peru
Exchange
1928
1931
1932
Uruguay
Exchange
1926
1928
1929
Venezuela
Coin
1923
1927
1930a And freedom of gold export and import.b Including colonies (except British Honduras) and possessions without a national currency: Guernsey, Jersey, Malta, Gibraltar, Cyprus, Bermuda, British West Indies, British Guiana, British Somaliland, Falkland Islands, British West African and certain South African colonies, certain Oceanic colonies.cIncluding countries and territories with U.S. dollar as exclusive or predominant currency: British Honduras, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Panama, Puerto Rico, Alaska, Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, Midway Islands, Wake Island, Guam, and American Samoa.dNot applicable; "the United States dollar…constituted the central point of reference in the whole post-war stabilization effort and was throughout the period of stabilization at par with gold." -- Brown (1940, p. 394)e1919 for freedom of gold export.f Including colonies and possessions, except Indochina and Syria.g Including Papua (New Guinea) and adjoining islands.h Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika.I Including Newfoundland.j Including Bhutan, Nepal, British Swaziland, Mauritius, Pemba Island, and Zanzibar.k 1925 for freedom of gold export.l Including Luxemburg and Belgian Congo.m Including Italian Somaliland and Tripoli.n Including Dutch Guiana and Curacao (Netherlands Antilles).o Including territories, except Portuguese India.p Including Liechtenstein.q Including Greenland and Iceland.r Including Greater Lebanon.s Including Korea and Taiwan.t Including Straits Settlements, Sarawak, Labuan, and Borneo.
Sources: Bett (1957, p. 36), Brown (1940), Bureau of the Mint (1929), Ding (1967, pp. 6-7), Director of the Mint (1917), dos Santos (1996, pp. 191-92), Eichengreen (1992, p. 299), Federal Reserve Bulletin (1928, pp. 562, 847; 1929, pp. 201, 265, 549; 1930, pp. 72, 440; 1931, p. 554; 1935, p. 290; 1936, pp. 322, 760), Gunasekera (1962), Jonung (1984, p. 361), Kemmerer (1954, pp. 301 302), League of Nations (1926, pp. 7, 15; 1927, pp. 165-69; 1929, pp. 208-13; 1931, pp. 265-69; 1937/38, p. 107; 1946, p. 2), Moggridge (1989, p. 305), Officer (1996, chs. 3-4), Powell (1999, pp. 23-24), Spalding (1928), Wallich (1950, pp. 32-37), Yeager (1976, pp. 330, 344, 359); Young (1925, p. 76).
Characteristics of Gold Standards
Types of Gold Standards
Pure Coin and Mixed Standards
In theory, "domestic" gold standards -- those that do not depend on interaction with other countries -- are of two types: "pure coin" standard and "mixed" (meaning coin and paper, but also called simply "coin") standard. The two systems share several properties. (1) There is a well-defined and fixed gold content of the domestic monetary unit. For example, the dollar is defined as a specified weight of pure gold. (2) Gold coin circulates as money with unlimited legal-tender power (meaning it is a compulsorily acceptable means of payment of any amount in any transaction or obligation). (3) Privately owned bullion (gold in mass, foreign coin considered as mass, or gold in the form of bars) is convertible into gold coin in unlimited amounts at the government mint or at the central bank, and at the "mint price" (of gold, the inverse of the gold content of the monetary unit). (4) Private parties have no restriction on their holding or use of gold (except possibly that privately created coined money may be prohibited); in particular, they may melt coin into bullion. The effect is as if coin were sold to the monetary authority (central bank or Treasury acting as a central bank) for bullion. It would make sense for the authority to sell gold bars directly for coin, even though not legally required, thus saving the cost of coining. Conditions (3) and (4) commit the monetary authority in effect to transact in coin and bullion in each direction such that the mint price, or gold content of the monetary unit, governs in the marketplace.
Under a pure coin standard, gold is the only money. Under a mixed standard, there are also paper currency (notes) -- issued by the government, central bank, or commercial banks -- and demand-deposit liabilities of banks. Government or central-bank notes (and central-bank deposit liabilities) are directly convertible into gold coin at the fixed established price on demand. Commercial-bank notes and demand deposits might be converted not directly into gold but rather into gold-convertible government or central-bank currency. This indirect convertibility of commercial-bank liabilities would apply certainly if the government or central- bank currency were legal tender but also generally even if it were not. As legal tender, gold coin is always exchangeable for paper currency or deposits at the mint price, and usually the monetary authority would provide gold bars for its coin. Again, two-way transactions in unlimited amounts fix the currency price of gold at the mint price. The credibility of the monetary-authority commitment to a fixed price of gold is the essence of a successful, ongoing gold-standard regime.
A pure coin standard did not exist in any country during the gold-standard periods. Indeed, over time, gold coin declined from about one-fifth of the world money supply in 1800 (2/3 for gold and silver coin together, as silver was then the predominant monetary standard) to 17 percent in 1885 (1/3 for gold and silver, for an eleven-major-country aggregate), 10 percent in 1913 (15 percent for gold and silver, for the major-country aggregate), and essentially zero in 1928 for the major-country aggregate (Triffin, 1964, pp. 15, 56). See Table 3. The zero figure means not that gold coin did not exist, rather that its main use was as reserves for Treasuries, central banks, and (generally to a lesser extent) commercial banks.
Table 3
Structure of Money: Major-Countries Aggregatea
(end of year)

1885
1913
1928
Money Supplyb ($ billion)
8
26
50
Ratio of Metallic Moneyc to Money Supply (percent)
33
15
0d
Ratio of Official Reservese to Money Supply (percent)
18
16
21
Ratio of Official to Official-plus-Money Goldf (percent)
33
54
99a Core countries: Britain, United States, France, Germany. Western Europe: Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland. Other countries: Canada, Japan, Sweden.b Metallic money, minor coin, paper currency, and demand deposits.c 1885: Gold and silver coin; overestimate, as includes commercial-bank holdings that could not be isolated from coin held outside banks by the public. 1913: Gold and silver coin. 1928: Gold coin.d Less than 0.5 percent.e 1885 and 1913: Gold, silver, and foreign exchange. 1928: Gold and foreign exchange.f Official gold: Gold in official reserves. Money gold: Gold-coin component of money supply.
Sources: Triffin (1964, p. 62), Sayers (1976, pp. 348, 352) for 1928 Bank of England dollar reserves (dated January 2, 1929).
An "international" gold standard, which naturally requires that more than one country be on gold, requires in addition freedom both of international gold flows (private parties are permitted to import or export gold without restriction) and of foreign-exchange transactions (an absence of exchange control). Then the fixed mint prices of any two countries on the gold standard imply a fixed exchange rate ("mint parity") between the countries' currencies. For example, the dollar- sterling mint parity was $4.8665635 per pound sterling (the British pound).
Gold-Bullion and Gold-Exchange Standards
In principle, a country can choose among four kinds of international gold standards -- the pure coin and mixed standards, already mentioned, a gold-bullion standard, and a gold- exchange standard. Under a gold-bullion standard, gold coin neither circulates as money nor is it used as commercial-bank reserves, and the government does not coin gold. The monetary authority (Treasury or central bank) stands ready to transact with private parties, buying or selling gold bars (usable only for import or export, not as domestic currency) for its notes, and generally a minimum size of transaction is specified. For example, in 1925 1931 the Bank of England was on the bullion standard and would sell gold bars only in the minimum amount of 400 fine (pure) ounces, approximately £1699 or $8269. Finally, the monetary authority of a country on a gold-exchange standard buys and sells not gold in any form but rather gold- convertible foreign exchange, that is, the currency of a country that itself is on the gold coin or bullion standard.
Gold Points and Gold Export/Import
A fixed exchange rate (the mint parity) for two countries on the gold standard is an oversimplification that is often made but is misleading. There are costs of importing or exporting gold. These costs include freight, insurance, handling (packing and cartage), interest on money committed to the transaction, risk premium (compensation for risk), normal profit, any deviation of purchase or sale price from the mint price, possibly mint charges, and possibly abrasion (wearing out or removal of gold content of coin -- should the coin be sold abroad by weight or as bullion). Expressing the exporting costs as the percent of the amount invested (or, equivalently, as percent of parity), the product of 1/100th of these costs and mint parity (the number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency) is added to mint parity to obtain the gold-export point -- the exchange rate at which gold is exported. To obtain the gold-import point, the product of 1/100th of the importing costs and mint parity is subtracted from mint parity.
If the exchange rate is greater than the gold-export point, private-sector "gold-point arbitrageurs" export gold, thereby obtaining foreign currency. Conversely, for the exchange rate less than the gold-import point, gold is imported and foreign currency relinquished. Usually the gold is, directly or indirectly, purchased from the monetary authority of the one country and sold to the monetary authority in the other. The domestic-currency cost of the transaction per unit of foreign currency obtained is the gold-export point. That per unit of foreign currency sold is the gold-import point. Also, foreign currency is sold, or purchased, at the exchange rate. Therefore arbitrageurs receive a profit proportional to the exchange-rate/gold-point divergence.
Gold-Point Arbitrage
However, the arbitrageurs' supply of foreign currency eliminates profit by returning the exchange rate to below the gold-export point. Therefore perfect "gold-point arbitrage" would ensure that the exchange rate has upper limit of the gold-export point. Similarly, the arbitrageurs' demand for foreign currency returns the exchange rate to above the gold-import point, and perfect arbitrage ensures that the exchange rate has that point as a lower limit. It is important to note what induces the private sector to engage in gold-point arbitrage: (1) the profit motive; and (2) the credibility of the commitment to (a) the fixed gold price and (b) freedom of foreign exchange and gold transactions, on the part of the monetary authorities of both countries.
Gold-Point Spread
The difference between the gold points is called the (gold-point) spread. The gold points and the spread may be expressed as percentages of parity. Estimates of gold points and spreads involving center countries are provided for the classical and interwar gold standards in Tables 4 and 5. Noteworthy is that the spread for a given country pair generally declines over time both over the classical gold standard (evidenced by the dollar-sterling figures) and for the interwar compared to the classical period.
Table 4
Gold-Point Estimates: Classical Gold Standard


Countries


Period
Gold Pointsa
(percent)

Spreadd
(percent)

Method of Computation
Exportb
Importc
U.S./Britain
1881-1890
0.6585
0.7141
1.3726
PA
U.S./Britain
1891-1900
0.6550
0.6274
1.2824
PA
U.S./Britain
1901-1910
0.4993
0.5999
1.0992
PA
U.S./Britain
1911-1914
0.5025
0.5915
1.0940
PA
France/U.S.
1877-1913
0.6888
0.6290
1.3178
MED
Germany/U.S.
1894-1913
0.4907
0.7123
1.2030
MED
France/Britain
1877-1913
0.4063
0.3964
0.8027
MED
Germany/Britain
1877-1913
0.3671
0.4405
0.8076
MED
Germany/France
1877-1913
0.4321
0.5556
0.9877
MED
Austria/Britain
1912
0.6453
0.6037
1.2490
SE
Netherlands/Britain
1912
0.5534
0.3552
0.9086
SE
Scandinaviae /Britain
1912
0.3294
0.6067
0.9361
SEa For numerator country. b Gold-import point for denominator country.c Gold-export point for denominator country.d Gold-export point plus gold-import point.e Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.
Method of Computation: PA = period average. MED = median exchange rate form estimate of various authorities for various dates, converted to percent deviation from parity. SE = single exchange-rate- form estimate, converted to percent deviation from parity.
Sources: U.S./Britain -- Officer (1996, p. 174). France/U.S., Germany/U.S., France/Britain, Germany/Britain, Germany/France -- Morgenstern (1959, pp. 178-81). Austria/Britain, Netherlands/Britain, Scandinavia/Britain -- Easton (1912, pp. 358-63).
Table 5
Gold-Point Estimates: Interwar Gold Standard


Countries


Period
Gold Pointsa
(percent)

Spreadd
(percent)

Method of Computation
Exportb
Importc
U.S./Britain
1925-1931
0.6287
0.4466
1.0753
PA
U.S./France
1926-1928e
0.4793
0.5067
0.9860
PA
U.S./France
1928-1933f
0.5743
0.3267
0.9010
PA
U.S./Germany
1926-1931
0.8295
0.3402
1.1697
PA
France/Britain
1926
0.2042
0.4302
0.6344
SE
France/Britain
1929-1933
0.2710
0.3216
0.5926
MED
Germany/Britain
1925-1933
0.3505
0.2676
0.6181
MED
Canada/Britain
1929
0.3521
0.3465
0.6986
SE
Netherlands/Britain
1929
0.2858
0.5146
0.8004
SE
Denmark/Britain
1926
0.4432
0.4930
0.9362
SE
Norway/Britain
1926
0.6084
0.3828
0.9912
SE
Sweden/Britain
1926
0.3881
0.3828
0.7709
SEa For numerator country. b Gold-import point for denominator country.c Gold-export point for denominator country.d Gold-export point plus gold-import point.e To end of June 1928. French-franc exchange-rate stabilization, but absence of currency convertibility; see Table 2.f Beginning July 1928. French-franc convertibility; see Table 2.
Method of Computation: PA = period average. MED = median exchange rate form estimate of various authorities for various dates, converted to percent deviation from parity. SE = single exchange-rate- form estimate, converted to percent deviation from parity.
Sources: U.S./Britain -- Officer (1996, p. 174). U.S./France, U.S./Germany, France/Britain 1929- 1933, Germany/Britain -- Morgenstern (1959, pp. 185-87). Canada/Britain, Netherlands/Britain -- Einzig (1929, pp. 98-101) [Netherlands/Britain currencies' mint parity from Spalding (1928, p. 135). France/Britain 1926, Denmark/Britain, Norway/Britain, Sweden/Britain -- Spalding (1926, pp. 429-30, 436).
The effective monetary standard of a country is distinguishable from its legal standard. For example, a country legally on bimetallism usually is effectively on either a gold or silver monometallic standard, depending on whether its "mint-price ratio" (the ratio of its mint price of gold to mint price of silver) is greater or less than the world price ratio. In contrast, a country might be legally on a gold standard but its banks (and government) have "suspended specie (gold) payments" (refusing to convert their notes into gold), so that the country is in fact on a "paper standard." The criterion adopted here is that a country is deemed on the gold standard if (1) gold is the predominant effective metallic money, or is the monetary bullion, (2) specie payments are in force, and (3) there is a limitation on the coinage and/or the legal-tender status of silver (the only practical and historical competitor to gold), thus providing institutional or legal support for the effective gold standard emanating from (1) and (2).
Implications for Money Supply
Consider first the domestic gold standard. Under a pure coin standard, the gold in circulation, monetary base, and money supply are all one. With a mixed standard, the money supply is the product of the money multiplier (dependent on the commercial-banks' reserves/deposit and the nonbank-public's currency/deposit ratios) and the monetary base (the actual and potential reserves of the commercial banking system, with potential reserves held by the nonbank public). The monetary authority alters the monetary base by changing its gold holdings and its loans, discounts, and securities portfolio (non gold assets, called its "domestic assets"). However, the level of its domestic assets is dependent on its gold reserves, because the authority generates demand liabilities (notes and deposits) by increasing its assets, and convertibility of these liabilities must be supported by a gold reserve, if the gold standard is to be maintained. Therefore the gold standard provides a constraint on the level (or growth) of the money supply.
The international gold standard involves balance-of-payments surpluses settled by gold imports at the gold-import point, and deficits financed by gold exports at the gold-export point. (Within the spread, there are no gold flows and the balance of payments is in equilibrium.) The change in the money supply is then the product of the money multiplier and the gold flow, providing the monetary authority does not change its domestic assets. For a country on a gold- exchange standard, holdings of "foreign exchange" (the reserve currency) take the place of gold. In general, the "international assets" of a monetary authority may consist of both gold and foreign exchange.
The Classical Gold Standard
Dates of Countries Joining the Gold Standard
Table 1 (above) lists all countries that were on the classical gold standard, the gold- standard type to which each adhered, and the period(s) on the standard. Discussion here concentrates on the four core countries. For centuries, Britain was on an effective silver standard under legal bimetallism. The country switched to an effective gold standard early in the eighteenth century, solidified by the (mistakenly) gold-overvalued mint-price ratio established by Isaac Newton, Master of the Mint, in 1717. In 1774 the legal-tender property of silver was restricted, and Britain entered the gold standard in the full sense on that date. In 1798 coining of silver was suspended, and in 1816 the gold standard was formally adopted, ironically during a paper-standard regime (the "Bank Restriction Period," of 1797-1821), with the gold standard effectively resuming in 1821.
The United States was on an effective silver standard dating back to colonial times, legally bimetallic from 1786, and on an effective gold standard from 1834. The legal gold standard began in 1873-1874, when Acts ended silver-dollar coinage and limited legal tender of existing silver coins. Ironically, again the move from formal bimetallism to a legal gold standard occurred during a paper standard (the "greenback period," of 1861-1878), with a dual legal and effective gold standard from 1879.
International Shift to the Gold Standard
The rush to the gold standard occurred in the 1870s, with the adherence of Germany, the Scandinavian countries, France, and other European countries. Legal bimetallism shifted from effective silver to effective gold monometallism around 1850, as gold discoveries in the United States and Australia resulted in overvalued gold at the mints. The gold/silver market situation subsequently reversed itself, and, to avoid a huge inflow of silver, many European countries suspended the coinage of silver and limited its legal-tender property. Some countries (France, Belgium, Switzerland) adopted a "limping" gold standard, in which existing former-standard silver coin retained full legal tender, permitting the monetary authority to redeem its notes in silver as well as gold.
As Table 1 shows, most countries were on a gold-coin (always meaning mixed) standard. The gold-bullion standard did not exist in the classical period (although in Britain that standard was embedded in legislation of 1819 that established a transition to restoration of the gold standard). A number of countries in the periphery were on a gold-exchange standard, usually because they were colonies or territories of a country on a gold-coin standard. In situations in which the periphery country lacked its own (even-coined) currency, the gold-exchange standard existed almost by default. Some countries -- China, Persia, parts of Latin America -- never joined the classical gold standard, instead retaining their silver or bimetallic standards.
Sources of Instability of the Classical Gold Standard
There were three elements making for instability of the classical gold standard. First, the use of foreign exchange as reserves increased as the gold standard progressed. Available end-of- year data indicate that, worldwide, foreign exchange in official reserves (the international assets of the monetary authority) increased by 36 percent from 1880 to 1899 and by 356 percent from 1899 to 1913. In comparison, gold in official reserves increased by 160 percent from 1880 to 1903 but only by 88 percent from 1903 to 1913. (Lindert, 1969, pp. 22, 25) While in 1913 only Germany among the center countries held any measurable amount of foreign exchange -- 15 percent of total reserves excluding silver (which was of limited use) -- the percentage for the rest of the world was double that for Germany (Table 6). If there were a rush to cash in foreign exchange for gold, reduction or depletion of the gold of reserve-currency countries could place the gold standard in jeopardy.
Table 6
Share of Foreign Exchange in Official Reserves
(end of year, percent)

Country
1913

1928b
Including Silvera
Excluding Silverb
Britain
0
0
10
United States
0
0
0c
France
0d
0d
51
Germany
13
15
16
Rest of world
27
31
32a Official reserves: gold, silver, and foreign exchange.b Official reserves: gold and foreign exchange.c Less than 0.05 percent.d Less than 0.5 percent.
Sources: 1913 -- Lindert (1969, pp. 10-11). 1928 -- Britain: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [cited as BG] (1943, p. 551), Sayers (1976, pp. 348, 352) for Bank of England dollar reserves (dated January 2, 1929). United States: BG (1943, pp. 331, 544), foreign exchange consisting of Federal Reserve Banks holdings of foreign-currency bills. France and Germany: Nurkse (1944, p. 234). Rest of world [computed as residual]: gold, BG (1943, pp. 544-51); foreign exchange, from "total" (Triffin, 1964, p. 66), France, and Germany.
Second, Britain -- the predominant reserve-currency country -- was in a particularly sensitive situation. Again considering end-of 1913 data, almost half of world foreign-exchange reserves were in sterling, but the Bank of England had only three percent of world gold reserves (Tables 7-8). Defining the "reserve ratio" of the reserve-currency-country monetary authority as the ratio of (i) official reserves to (ii) liabilities to foreign monetary authorities held in financial institutions in the country, in 1913 this ratio was only 31 percent for the Bank of England, far lower than those of the monetary authorities of the other core countries (Table 9). An official run on sterling could easily force Britain off the gold standard. Because sterling was an international currency, private foreigners also held considerable liquid assets in London, and could themselves initiate a run on sterling.
Table 7
Composition of World Official Foreign-Exchange Reserves
(end of year, percent)
Currency
1913a
1928
British pounds
47
77
U.S. dollars
2
21
French francs
30
}
2}
}
German marks
16
Other
5ba Excluding holdings for which currency unspecified.b Primarily Dutch guilders and Scandinavian kroner.
Sources: 1913 -- Lindert (1969, pp. 18-19). 1928 -- Components of world total: Triffin (1964, pp. 22, 66), Sayers (1976, pp. 348, 352) for Bank of England dollar reserves (dated January 2, 1929), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [cited as BG] (1943, p. 331) for Federal Reserve Banks holdings of foreign-currency bills.
Table 8
Official-Reserves Components: Percent of World Total
(end of year)

Country
1913
1928
Gold
Foreign Exchange
Gold
Foreign Exchange
Britain
3
0
7
3
United States
27
0
37
0a
France
14
0b
13
39
Germany
6
5
7
4
Rest of world
50
95
36
54a Less than 0.05 percent. b Less than 0.5 percent.
Sources: Gold -- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [cited as BG] (1943, pp. 544, 551). Foreign Exchange -- 1913: Lindert (1969, pp. 11-12). 1928: Sayers (1976, pp. 348, 352) for Bank of England dollar reserves (dated January 2, 1929). United States: BG (1943, pp. 331, 544) for Federal Reserve Banks holdings of foreign-currency bills. France and Germany: Nurkse (1944, p. 234). Rest of world: computed as residual from "total" Triffin (1964, p. 66), France, and Germany.
Table 9
Reserve Ratiosa of Reserve-Currency Countries
(end of year)

Country
1913

1928c
Including Silverb
Excluding Silverc
Britain
0.31
0.31
0.33
United States
90.55
64.42
5.45
France
2.38
2.02
not available
Germany
2.11
1.75
not available a Ratio of official reserves to official liquid liabilities (that is, liabilities to foreign governments and central banks).b Official reserves: gold, silver, and foreign exchange.c Official reserves: gold and foreign exchange.
Sources : 1913 -- Lindert (1969, pp. 10-11, 19). Foreign-currency holdings for which currency unspecified allocated proportionately to the four currencies based on known distribution. 1928 -- Gold reserves: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [cited as BG] (1943, pp. 544, 551). Foreign- exchange reserves: Sayers (1976, pp. 348, 352) for Bank of England dollar reserves (dated January 2, 1929); BG (1943, p. 331) for Federal Reserve Banks holdings of foreign-currency bills. Official liquid liabilities: Triffin (1964, p. 22), Sayers (1976, pp. 348, 352).
Third, the United States, though a center country, was a great source of instability to the gold standard. Its Treasury held a high percentage of world gold reserves (more than that of the three other core countries combined in 1913), resulting in an absurdly high reserve ratio -- Tables 7-9). With no central bank and a decentralized banking system, financial crises were frequent. Far from the United States assisting Britain, gold often flowed from the Bank of England to the United States to satisfy increases in U.S. demand for money. Though in economic size the United States was the largest of the core countries, in many years it was a net importer rather than exporter of capital to the rest of the world -- the opposite of the other core countries. The political power of silver interests and recurrent financial panics led to imperfect credibility in the U.S. commitment to the gold standard. Runs on banks and runs on the Treasury gold reserve placed the U.S. gold standard near collapse in the early and mid-1890s. During that period, the credibility of the Treasury's commitment to the gold standard was shaken. Indeed, the gold standard was saved in 1895 (and again in 1896) only by cooperative action of the Treasury and a bankers' syndicate that stemmed gold exports.
Rules of the Game
According to the "rules of the [gold-standard] game," central banks were supposed to reinforce, rather than "sterilize" (moderate or eliminate) or ignore, the effect of gold flows on the monetary supply. A gold outflow typically decreases the international assets of the central bank and thence the monetary base and money supply. The central-bank's proper response is: (1) raise its "discount rate," the central-bank interest rate for rediscounting securities (cashing, at a further deduction from face value, a short-term security from a financial institution that previously discounted the security), thereby inducing commercial banks to adopt a higher reserves/deposit ratio and therefore decreasing the money multiplier; and (2) decrease lending and sell securities, thereby decreasing domestic assets and thence the monetary base. On both counts the money supply is further decreased. Should the central bank rather increase its domestic assets when it loses gold, it engages in "sterilization" of the gold flow and is decidedly not following the "rules of the game." The converse argument (involving gold inflow and increases in the money supply) also holds, with sterilization involving the central bank decreasing its domestic assets when it gains gold.
Price Specie-Flow Mechanism
A country experiencing a balance-of-payments deficit loses gold and its money supply decreases, both automatically and by policy in accordance with the "rules of the game." Money income contracts and the price level falls, thereby increasing exports and decreasing imports. Similarly, a surplus country gains gold, the money supply increases, money income expands, the price level rises, exports decrease and imports increase. In each case, balance-of-payments equilibrium is restored via the current account. This is called the "price specie-flow mechanism." To the extent that wages and prices are inflexible, movements of real income in the same direction as money income occur; in particular, the deficit country suffers unemployment but the payments imbalance is nevertheless corrected.
The capital account also acts to restore balance, via interest-rate increases in the deficit country inducing a net inflow of capital. The interest-rate increases also reduce real investment and thence real income and imports. Similarly, interest-rate decreases in the surplus country elicit capital outflow and increase real investment, income, and imports. This process enhances the current-account correction of the imbalance.
One problem with the "rules of the game" is that, on "global-monetarist" theoretical grounds, they were inconsequential. Under fixed exchange rates, gold flows simply adjust money supply to money demand; the money supply is not determined by policy. Also, prices, interest rates, and incomes are determined worldwide. Even core countries can influence these variables domestically only to the extent that they help determine them in the global marketplace. Therefore the price-specie-flow and like mechanisms cannot occur. Historical data support this conclusion: gold flows were too small to be suggestive of these mechanisms; and prices, incomes, and interest rates moved closely in correspondence (rather than in the opposite directions predicted by the adjustment mechanisms induced by the "rules of the game") -- at least among non-periphery countries, especially the core group.
Discount Rate Rule and the Bank of England
However, the Bank of England did, in effect, manage its discount rate ("Bank Rate") in accordance with rule (1). The Bank's primary objective was to maintain convertibility of its notes into gold, that is, to preserve the gold standard, and its principal policy tool was Bank Rate. When its "liquidity ratio" of gold reserves to outstanding note liabilities decreased, it would usually increase Bank Rate. The increase in Bank Rate carried with it market short-term increase rates, inducing a short-term capital inflow and thereby moving the exchange rate away from the gold-export point by increasing the exchange value of the pound. The converse also held, with a rise in the liquidity ratio involving a Bank Rate decrease, capital outflow, and movement of the exchange rate away from the gold import point. The Bank was constantly monitoring its liquidity ratio, and in response altered Bank Rate almost 200 times over 1880- 1913.
While the Reichsbank (the German central bank), like the Bank of England, generally moved its discount rate inversely to its liquidity ratio, most other central banks often violated the rule, with changes in their discount rates of inappropriate direction, or of insufficient amount or frequency. The Bank of France, in particular, kept its discount rate stable. Unlike the Bank of England, it chose to have large gold reserves (see Table 8), with payments imbalances accommodated by fluctuations in its gold rather than financed by short-term capital flows. The United States, lacking a central bank, had no discount rate to use as a policy instrument.
Sterilization Was Dominant
As for rule (2), that the central-bank's domestic and international assets move in the same direction; in fact the opposite behavior, sterilization, was dominant, as shown in Table 10. The Bank of England followed the rule more than any other central bank, but even so violated it more often than not! How then did the classical gold standard cope with payments imbalances? Why was it a stable system?
Table 10
Annual Changes in Internationala and Domesticb Assets of Central Bank
Percent of Changes in the Same Directionc
Country
1880-1913d
1922-1936d
Britain
48
33
United States
__
25
France
26
33
Germany
31
29
British Dominionse
__
13
Western Europef
32
32
Scandinaviag
40
25
Eastern Europeh
33
28
South Americai
__
23a 1880-1913: Gold, silver and foreign exchange. 1922-1936: Gold and foreign exchange.b Domestic income-earning assets: discounts, loans, securities.c Implying country is following "rules of the game." Observations with zero or negligible changes in either class of assets excluded.d Years when country is off gold standard excluded. See Tables 1 and 2.e Australia and South Africa.f1880-1913: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, and Netherlands. 1922-1936: Austria, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland.g Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. h1880-1913: Russia. 1922-1936: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia.I Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay.
Sources: Bloomfield (1959, p. 49), Nurkse (1944, p. 69).
The Stability of the Classical Gold Standard
The fundamental reason for the stability of the classical gold standard is that there was always absolute private-sector credibility in the commitment to the fixed domestic-currency price of gold on the part of the center country (Britain), two (France and Germany) of the three remaining core countries, and certain other European countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Scandinavia). Certainly, that was true from the late-1870s onward. (For the United States, this absolute credibility applied from about 1900.) In earlier periods, that commitment had a contingency aspect: it was recognized that convertibility could be suspended in the event of dire emergency (such as war); but, after normal conditions were restored, convertibility would be re-established at the pre-existing mint price and gold contracts would again be honored. The Bank Restriction Period is an example of the proper application of the contingency, as is the greenback period (even though the United States, effectively on the gold standard, was legally on bimetallism).
Absolute Credibility Meant Zero Convertibility and Exchange Risk
The absolute credibility in countries' commitment to convertiblity at the existing mint price implied that there was extremely low, essentially zero, convertibility risk (the probability that Treasury or central-bank notes would not be redeemed in gold at the established mint price) and exchange risk (the probability that the mint parity between two currencies would be altered, or that exchange control or prohibition of gold export would be instituted).
Reasons Why Commitment to Convertibility Was So Credible
There were many reasons why the commitment to convertibility was so credible. (1) Contracts were expressed in gold; if convertibility were abandoned, contracts would inevitably be violated -- an undesirable outcome for the monetary authority. (2) Shocks to the domestic and world economies were infrequent and generally mild. There was basically international peace and domestic calm.
(3) The London capital market was the largest, most open, most diversified in the world, and its gold market was also dominant. A high proportion of world trade was financed in sterling, London was the most important reserve-currency center, and balances of payments were often settled by transferring sterling assets rather than gold. Therefore sterling was an international currency -- not merely supplemental to gold but perhaps better: a boon to non- center countries, because sterling involved positive, not zero, interest return and its transfer costs were much less than those of gold. Advantages to Britain were the charges for services as an international banker, differential interest returns on its financial intermediation, and the practice of countries on a sterling (gold-exchange) standard of financing payments surpluses with Britain by piling up short-term sterling assets rather than demanding Bank of England gold.
(4) There was widespread ideology -- and practice -- of "orthodox metallism," involving authorities' commitment to an anti-inflation, balanced-budget, stable-money policy. In particular, the ideology implied low government spending and taxes and limited monetization of government debt (financing of budget deficits by printing money). Therefore it was not expected that a country's price level or inflation would get out of line with that of other countries, with resulting pressure on the country's adherence to the gold standard. (5) This ideology was mirrored in, and supported by, domestic politics. Gold had won over silver and paper, and stable-money interests (bankers, industrialists, manufacturers, merchants, professionals, creditors, urban groups) over inflationary interests (farmers, landowners, miners, debtors, rural groups).
(6) There was freedom from government regulation and a competitive environment, domestically and internationally. Therefore prices and wages were more flexible than in other periods of human history (before and after). The core countries had virtually no capital controls; the center country (Britain) had adopted free trade, and the other core countries had moderate tariffs. Balance-of-payments financing and adjustment could proceed without serious impediments.
(7) Internal balance (domestic macroeconomic stability, at a high level of real income and employment) was an unimportant goal of policy. Preservation of convertibility of paper currency into gold would not be superseded as the primary policy objective. While sterilization of gold flows was frequent (see above), the purpose was more "meeting the needs of trade" (passive monetary policy) than fighting unemployment (active monetary policy).
(8) The gradual establishment of mint prices over time ensured that the implied mint parities (exchange rates) were in line with relative price levels; so countries joined the gold standard with exchange rates in equilibrium. (9) Current-account and capital-account imbalances tended to be offsetting for the core countries, especially for Britain. A trade deficit induced a gold loss and a higher interest rate, attracting a capital inflow and reducing capital outflow. Indeed, the capital- exporting core countries -- Britain, France, and Germany -- could eliminate a gold loss simply by reducing lending abroad.
Rareness of Violations of Gold Points
Many of the above reasons not only enhanced credibility in existing mint prices and parities but also kept international-payments imbalances, and hence necessary adjustment, of small magnitude. Responding to the essentially zero convertibility and exchange risks implied by the credible commitment, private agents further reduced the need for balance-of-payments adjustment via gold-point arbitrage (discussed above) and also via a specific kind of speculation. When the exchange rate moved beyond a gold point, arbitrage acted to return it to the spread. So it is not surprising that "violations of the gold points" were rare on a monthly average basis, as demonstrated in Table 11 for the dollar, franc, and mark exchange rate versus sterling. Certainly, gold-point violations did occur; but they rarely persisted sufficiently to be counted on monthly average data. Such measured violations were generally associated with financial crises. (The number of dollar-sterling violations for 1890-1906 exceeding that for 1889-1908 is due to the results emanating from different researchers using different data. Nevertheless, the important common finding is the low percent of months encompassed by violations.)
Table 11
Violations of Gold Points

Exchange Rate

Time Period

Number of Months
Violations
Number
Percent of Months
dollar-sterling
1889-1908
240
1
0.4
dollar-sterling
1890-1906
204
3
1.5
dollar-sterling
1925-1931a
76
0
0
franc-sterling
1889-1908
240
12b
5.0
mark-sterling
1889-1908
240
18b
7.5a May 1925 – August 1931: full months during which both United States and Britain on gold standard.b Approximate number, deciphered from graph.
Sources: Dollar-sterling, 1890-1906 and 1925-1931 -- Officer (1996, p. 235). All other -- Giovannini (1993, pp. 130-31).
Stabilizing Speculation
The perceived extremely low convertibility and exchange risks gave private agents profitable opportunities not only outside the spread (gold-point arbitrage) but also within the spread (exchange-rate speculation). As the exchange value of a country's currency weakened, the exchange rate approaching the gold-export point, speculators had an ever greater incentive to purchase domestic currency with foreign currency (a capital inflow); for they had good reason to believe that the exchange rate would move in the opposite direction, whereupon they would reverse their transaction at a profit. Similarly, a strengthened currency, with the exchange rate approaching the gold-import point, involved speculators selling the domestic currency for foreign currency (a capital outflow). Clearly, the exchange rate would either not go beyond the gold point (via the actions of other speculators of the same ilk) or would quickly return to the spread (via gold-point arbitrage). Also, the further the exchange rate moved toward the gold point, the greater the potential profit opportunity; for there was a decreased distance to that gold point and an increased distance from the other point.
This "stabilizing speculation" enhanced the exchange value of depreciating currencies that were about to lose gold; and thus the gold loss could be prevented. The speculation was all the more powerful, because the absence of controls on capital movements meant private capital flows were highly responsive to exchange-rate changes. Dollar-sterling data, in Table 12, show that this speculation was extremely efficient in keeping the exchange rate away from the gold points -- and increasingly effective over time. Interestingly, these statements hold even for the 1890s, during which at times U.S. maintenance of currency convertibility was precarious. The average deviation of the exchange rate from the midpoint of the spread fell decade-by-decade from about 1/3 of one percent of parity in 1881-1890 (23 percent of the gold-point spread) to only 12/100th of one percent of parity in 1911-1914 (11 percent of the spread).
Table 12
Average Deviation of Dollar-Sterling Exchange Rate from Gold-Point-Spread Midpoint
Time Period
Percent of Parity
Percent of Spread
Quarterly observations
1881-1890
0.32
23
1891-1900
0.25
19
1901-1910
0.15
13
1911-1914a
0.12
11
1925-1931b
0.28
26
Monthly observations
1890-1906
0.24
20
1925-1931c
0.28
26a Ending with second quarter of 1914.b Third quarter 1925 – second quarter 1931: full quarters during which both United States and Britain on gold standard.c May 1925 – August 1931: full months during which both United States and Britain on gold standard.
Source: Officer (1996, pp. 182, 191, 272).
Government Policies That Enhanced Gold-Standard Stability
Government policies also enhanced gold-standard stability. First, by the turn of the century South Africa -- the main world gold producer -- sold all its gold in London, either to private parties or actively to the Bank of England, with the Bank serving also as residual purchaser of the gold. Thus the Bank had the means to replenish its gold reserves. Second, the orthodox- metallism ideology and the leadership of the Bank of England -- other central banks would often gear their monetary policy to that of the Bank -- kept monetary policies harmonized. Monetary discipline was maintained.
Third, countries used "gold devices," primarily the manipulation of gold points, to affect gold flows. For example, the Bank of England would foster gold imports by lowering the foreign gold-export point (number of units of foreign currency per pound, the British gold-import point) through interest-free loans to gold importers or raising its purchase price for bars and foreign coin. The Bank would discourage gold exports by lowering the foreign gold-import point (the British gold-export point) via increasing its selling prices for gold bars and foreign coin, refusing to sell bars, or redeeming its notes in underweight domestic gold coin. These policies were alternative to increasing Bank Rate.
The Bank of France and Reichsbank employed gold devices relative to discount-rate changes more than Britain did. Some additional policies included converting notes into gold only in Paris or Berlin rather than at branches elsewhere in the country, the Bank of France converting its notes in silver rather than gold (permitted under its "limping" gold standard), and the Reichsbank using moral suasion to discourage the export of gold. The U.S. Treasury followed similar policies at times. In addition to providing interest-free loans to gold importers and changing the premium at which it would sell bars (or refusing to sell bars outright), the Treasury condoned banking syndicates to put pressure on gold arbitrageurs to desist from gold export in 1895 and 1896, a time when the U.S. adherence to the gold standard was under stress.
Fourth, the monetary system was adept at conserving gold, as evidenced in Table 3. This was important, because the increased gold required for a growing world economy could be obtained only from mining or from nonmonetary hoards. While the money supply for the eleven- major-country aggregate more than tripled from 1885 to 1913, the percent of the money supply in the form of metallic money (gold and silver) more than halved. This process did not make the gold standard unstable, because gold moved into commercial-bank and central-bank (or Treasury) reserves: the ratio of gold in official reserves to official plus money gold increased from 33 to 54 percent. The relative influence of the public versus private sector in reducing the proportion of metallic money in the money supply is an issue warranting exploration by monetary historians.
Fifth, while not regular, central-bank cooperation was not generally required in the stable environment in which the gold standard operated. Yet this cooperation was forthcoming when needed, that is, during financial crises. Although Britain was the center country, the precarious liquidity position of the Bank of England meant that it was more often the recipient than the provider of financial assistance. In crises, it would obtain loans from the Bank of France (also on occasion from other central banks), and the Bank of France would sometimes purchase sterling to push up that currency's exchange value. Assistance also went from the Bank of England to other central banks, as needed. Further, the credible commitment was so strong that private bankers did not hesitate to make loans to central banks in difficulty.
In sum, "virtuous" two-way interactions were responsible for the stability of the gold standard. The credible commitment to convertibility of paper money at the established mint price, and therefore the fixed mint parities, were both a cause and a result of (1) the stable environment in which the gold standard operated, (2) the stabilizing behavior of arbitrageurs and speculators, and (3) the responsible policies of the authorities -- and (1), (2), and (3), and their individual elements, also interacted positively among themselves.
Experience of Periphery
An important reason for periphery countries to join and maintain the gold standard was the access to the capital markets of the core countries thereby fostered. Adherence to the gold standard connoted that the peripheral country would follow responsible monetary, fiscal, and debt-management policies -- and, in particular, faithfully repay the interest on and principal of debt. This "good housekeeping seal of approval" (the term coined by Bordo and Rockoff, 1996), by reducing the risk premium, involved a lower interest rate on the country's bonds sold abroad, and very likely a higher volume of borrowing. The favorable terms and greater borrowing enhanced the country's economic development.
However, periphery countries bore the brunt of the burden of adjustment of payments imbalances with the core (and other Western European) countries, for three reasons. First, some of the periphery countries were on a gold-exchange standard. When they ran a surplus, they typically increased -- and with a deficit, decreased -- their liquid balances in London (or other reserve-currency country) rather than withdraw gold from the reserve-currency country. The monetary base of the periphery country would increase, or decrease, but that of the reserve-currency country would remain unchanged. This meant that such changes in domestic variables -- prices, incomes, interest rates, portfolios, etc.--that occurred to correct the surplus or deficit, were primarily in the periphery country. The periphery, rather than the core, "bore the burden of adjustment."
Second, when Bank Rate increased, London drew funds from France and Germany, that attracted funds from other Western European and Scandinavian countries, that drew capital from the periphery. Also, it was easy for a core country to correct a deficit by reducing lending to, or bringing capital home from, the periphery. Third, the periphery countries were underdeveloped; their exports were largely primary products (agriculture and mining), which inherently were extremely sensitive to world market conditions. This feature made adjustment in the periphery compared to the core take the form more of real than financial correction. This conclusion also follows from the fact that capital obtained from core countries for the purpose of economic development was subject to interruption and even reversal. While the periphery was probably better off with access to the capital than in isolation, its welfare gain was reduced by the instability of capital import.
The experience on adherence to the gold standard differed among periphery groups. The important British dominions and colonies -- Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and India -- successfully maintained the gold standard. They were politically stable and, of course, heavily influenced by Britain. They paid the price of serving as an economic cushion to the Bank of England's financial situation; but, compared to the rest of the periphery, gained a relatively stable long-term capital inflow. In undeveloped Latin American and Asia, adherence to the gold standard was fragile, with lack of complete credibility in the commitment to convertibility. Many of the reasons for credible commitment that applied to the core countries were absent -- for example, there were powerful inflationary interests, strong balance-of-payments shocks, and rudimentary banking sectors. For Latin America and Asia, the cost of adhering to the gold standard was very apparent: loss of the ability to depreciate the currency to counter reductions in exports. Yet the gain, in terms of a steady capital inflow from the core countries, was not as stable or reliable as for the British dominions and colonies.
The Breakdown of the Classical Gold Standard
The classical gold standard was at its height at the end of 1913, ironically just before it came to an end. The proximate cause of the breakdown of the classical gold standard was political: the advent of World War I in August 1914. However, it was the Bank of England's precarious liquidity position and the gold-exchange standard that were the underlying cause. With the outbreak of war, a run on sterling led Britain to impose extreme exchange control -- a postponement of both domestic and international payments -- that made the international gold standard non-operational. Convertibility was not legally suspended; but moral suasion, legalistic action, and regulation had the same effect. Gold exports were restricted by extralegal means (and by Trading with the Enemy legislation), with the Bank of England commandeering all gold imports and applying moral suasion to bankers and bullion brokers.
Almost all other gold-standard countries undertook similar policies in 1914 and 1915. The United States entered the war and ended its gold standard late, adopting extralegal restrictions on convertibility in 1917 (although in 1914 New York banks had temporarily imposed an informal embargo on gold exports). An effect of the universal removal of currency convertibility was the ineffectiveness of mint parities and inapplicability of gold points: floating exchange rates resulted.
Interwar Gold Standard
Return to the Gold Standard
In spite of the tremendous disruption to domestic economies and the worldwide economy caused by World War I, a general return to gold took place. However, the resulting interwar gold standard differed institutionally from the classical gold standard in several respects. First, the new gold standard was led not by Britain but rather by the United States. The U.S. embargo on gold exports (imposed in 1917) was removed in 1919, and currency convertibility at the prewar mint price was restored in 1922. The gold value of the dollar rather than of the pound sterling would typically serve as the reference point around which other currencies would be aligned and stabilized. Second, it follows that the core would now have two center countries, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Third, for many countries there was a time lag between stabilizing a country's currency in the foreign-exchange market (fixing the exchange rate or mint parity) and resuming currency convertibility. Given a lag, the former typically occurred first, currency stabilization operating via central-bank intervention in the foreign-exchange market (transacting in the domestic currency and a reserve currency, generally sterling or the dollar). Table 2 presents the dates of exchange- rate stabilization and currency convertibility resumption for the countries on the interwar gold standard. It is fair to say that the interwar gold standard was at its height at the end of 1928, after all core countries were fully on the standard and before the Great Depression began.
Fourth, the contingency aspect of convertibility conversion, that required restoration of convertibility at the mint price that existed prior to the emergency (World War I), was broken by various countries -- even core countries. Some countries (including the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Japan, Argentina) stabilized their currencies at the prewar mint price. However, other countries (France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Chile) established a gold content of their currency that was a fraction of the prewar level: the currency was devalued in terms of gold, the mint price was higher than prewar. A third group of countries (Germany, Austria, Hungary) stabilized new currencies adopted after hyperinflation. A fourth group (Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) consisted of countries that became independent or were created following the war and that joined the interwar gold standard. A fifth group (some Latin American countries) had been on silver or paper standards during the classical period but went on the interwar gold standard. A sixth country group (Russia) had been on the classical gold standard, but did not join the interwar gold standard. A seventh group (Spain, China, Iran) joined neither gold standard.
The fifth way in which the interwar gold standard diverged from the classical experience was the mix of gold-standard types. As Table 2 shows, the gold coin standard, dominant in the classical period, was far less prevalent in the interwar period. In particular, all four core countries had been on coin in the classical gold standard; but, of them, only the United States was on coin interwar. The gold-bullion standard, nonexistent prewar, was adopted by two core countries (United Kingdom and France) as well as by two Scandinavian countries (Denmark and Norway). Most countries were on a gold-exchange standard. The central banks of countries on the gold-exchange standard would convert their currencies not into gold but rather into "gold-exchange" currencies (currencies themselves convertible into gold), in practice often sterling, sometimes the dollar (the reserve currencies).
Instability of the Interwar Gold Standard
The features that fostered stability of the classical gold standard did not apply to the interwar standard; instead, many forces made for instability. (1) The process of establishing fixed exchange rates was piecemeal and haphazard, resulting in disequilibrium exchange rates. The United Kingdom restored convertibility at the prewar mint price without sufficient deflation, resulting in an overvalued currency of about ten percent. (Expressed in a common currency at mint parity, the British price level was ten percent higher than that of its trading partners and competitors). A depressed export sector and chronic balance-of-payments difficulties were to result. Other overvalued currencies (in terms of mint parity) were those of Denmark, Italy, and Norway. In contrast, France, Germany, and Belgium had undervalued currencies. (2) Wages and prices were less flexible than in the prewar period. In particular, powerful unions kept wages and unemployment high in British export industries, hindering balance-of-payments correction.
(3) Higher trade barriers than prewar also restrained adjustment.
(4) The gold-exchange standard economized on total world gold via the gold of reserve- currency countries backing their currencies in their reserves role for countries on that standard and also for countries on a coin or bullion standard that elected to hold part of their reserves in London or New York. (Another economizing element was continuation of the move of gold out of the money supply and into banking and official reserves that began in the classical period: for the eleven-major-country aggregate, gold declined to less than ½ of one percent of the money supply in 1928, and the ratio of official gold to official-plus-money gold reached 99 percent -- Table 3). The gold-exchange standard was inherently unstable, because of the conflict between (a) the expansion of sterling and dollar liabilities to foreign central banks to expand world liquidity, and (b) the resulting deterioration in the reserve ratio of the Bank of England, and U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Banks.
This instability was particularly severe in the interwar period, for several reasons. First, France was now a large official holder of sterling, with over half the official reserves of the Bank of France in foreign exchange in 1928, versus essentially none in 1913 (Table 6); and France was resentful that the United Kingdom had used its influence in the League of Nations to induce financially reconstructed countries in Europe to adopt the gold-exchange (sterling) standard. Second, many more countries were on the gold-exchange standard than prewar. Cooperation in restraining a run on sterling or the dollar would be difficult to achieve. Third, the gold-exchange standard, associated with colonies in the classical period, was viewed as a system inferior to a coin standard.
(5) In the classical period, London was the one dominant financial center; in the interwar period it was joined by New York and, in the late 1920s, Paris. Both private and official holdings of foreign currency could shift among the two or three centers, as interest-rate differentials and confidence levels changed.
(6) The problem with gold was not overall scarcity but rather maldistribution. In 1928, official reserve-currency liabilities were much more concentrated than in 1913: the United Kingdom accounted for 77 percent of world foreign-exchange reserves and France less than two percent (versus 47 and 30 percent in 1913 -- Table 7). Yet the United Kingdom held only seven percent of world official gold and France 13 percent (Table 8). Reflecting its undervalued currency, France also possessed 39 percent of world official foreign exchange. Incredibly, the United States held 37 percent of world official gold -- more than all the non-core countries together.
(7) Britain's financial position was even more precarious than in the classical period. In 1928, the gold and dollar reserves of the Bank of England covered only one third of London's liquid liabilities to official foreigners, a ratio hardly greater than in 1913 (and compared to a U.S. ratio of almost 5½ -- Table 9). Various elements made the financial position difficult compared to prewar. First, U.K. liquid liabilities were concentrated on stronger countries (France, United States), whereas its liquid assets were predominantly in weaker countries (such as Germany). Second, there was ongoing tension with France, that resented the sterling-dominated gold- exchange standard and desired to cash in its sterling holding for gold to aid its objective of achieving first-class financial status for Paris.
(8) Internal balance was an important goal of policy, which hindered balance-of-payments adjustment, and monetary policy was affected greatly by domestic politics rather than geared to preservation of currency convertibility. (9) Especially because of (8), the credibility in authorities' commitment to the gold standard was not absolute. Convertibility risk and exchange risk could be well above zero, and currency speculation could be destabilizing rather than stabilizing; so that when a country's currency approached or reached its gold-export point, speculators might anticipate that currency convertibility would not be maintained and the currency devalued. Hence they would sell rather than buy the currency, which, of course, would help bring about the very outcome anticipated.
(10) The "rules of the game" were infrequently followed and, for most countries, violated even more often than in the classical gold standard -- Table 10. Sterilization of gold inflows by the Bank of England can be viewed as an attempt to correct the overvalued pound by means of deflation. However, the U.S. and French sterilization of their persistent gold inflows reflected exclusive concern for the domestic economy and placed the burden of adjustment on other countries in the form of deflation.
(11) The Bank of England did not provide a leadership role in any important way, and central-bank cooperation was insufficient to establish credibility in the commitment to currency convertibility.
Breakdown of the Interwar Gold Standard
Although Canada effectively abandoned the gold standard early in 1929, this was a special case in two respects. First, the action was an early drastic reaction to high U.S. interest rates established to fight the stock-market boom but that carried the threat of unsustainable capital outflow and gold loss for other countries. Second, use of gold devices was the technique used to restrict gold exports and informally terminate the Canadian gold standard.
The beginning of the end of the interwar gold standard occurred with the Great Depression. The depression began in the periphery, with low prices for exports and debt-service requirements leading to insurmountable balance-of-payments difficulties while on the gold standard. However, U.S. monetary policy was an important catalyst. In the second half of 1927 the Federal Reserve pursued an easy-money policy, which supported foreign currencies but also fed the boom in the New York stock market. Reversing policy to fight the Wall Street boom, higher interest rates attracted monies to New York, which weakened sterling in particular. The stock market crash in October 1929, while helpful to sterling, was followed by a passive monetary policy that did not prevent the U.S. depression that started shortly thereafter and that spread to the rest of the world via declines in U.S. trade and lending. In 1929 and 1930 a number of periphery countries either formally suspended currency convertibility or restricted it so that their currencies went beyond the gold-export point.
It was destabilizing speculation, emanating from lack of confidence in authorities' commitment to currency convertibility that ended the interwar gold standard. In May 1931 there was a run on Austria's largest commercial bank, and the bank failed. The run spread to Germany, where an important bank also collapsed. The countries' central banks lost substantial reserves; international financial assistance was too late; and in July 1931 Germany adopted exchange control, followed by Austria in October. These countries were definitively off the gold standard.
The Austrian and German experiences, as well as British budgetary and political difficulties, were among the factors that destroyed confidence in sterling, which occurred in mid-July 1931. Runs on sterling ensued, and the Bank of England lost much of its reserves. Loans from abroad were insufficient, and in any event taken as a sign of weakness. The gold standard was abandoned in September, and the pound quickly and sharply depreciated on the foreign- exchange market, as overvaluation of the pound would imply.
Amazingly, there were no violations of the dollar-sterling gold points on a monthly average basis to the very end of August 1931 (Table 11). In contrast, the average deviation of the dollar-sterling exchange rate from the midpoint of the gold-point spread in 1925-1931 was more than double that in 1911-1914, by either of two measures (Table 12), suggesting less- dominant stabilizing speculation compared to the prewar period. Yet the 1925-1931 average deviation was not much more (in one case, even less) than in earlier decades of the classical gold standard. The trust in the Bank of England had a long tradition, and the shock to confidence in sterling that occurred in July 1931 was unexpected by the British authorities.
Following the U.K. abandonment of the gold standard, many countries followed, some to maintain their competitiveness via currency devaluation, others in response to destabilizing capital flows. The United States held on until 1933, when both domestic and foreign demands for gold, manifested in runs on U.S. commercial banks, became intolerable. The "gold bloc" countries (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Poland) and Danzig lasted even longer; but, with their currencies now overvalued and susceptible to destabilizing speculation, these countries succumbed to the inevitable by the end of 1936. Albania stayed on gold until occupied by Italy in 1939. As much as a cause, the Great Depression was a consequence of the gold standard; for gold-standard countries hesitated to inflate their economies for fear of weakening the balance of payments, suffering loss of gold and foreign-exchange reserves, and being forced to abandon convertibility or the gold parity. So the gold standard involved "golden fetters" (the title of the classic work of Eichengreen, 1992) that inhibited monetary and fiscal policy to fight the depression. Therefore, some have argued, these fetters seriously exacerbated the severity of the Great Depression within countries (because expansionary policy to fight unemployment was not adopted) and fostered the international transmission of the Depression (because as a country's output decreased, its imports fell, thus reducing exports and income of other countries).
The "international gold standard," defined as the period of time during which all four core countries were on the gold standard, existed from 1879 to 1914 (36 years) in the classical period and from 1926 or 1928 to 1931 (four or six years) in the interwar period. The interwar gold standard was a dismal failure in longevity, as well as in its association with the greatest depression the world has known.
References
Bayoumi, Tamim, Barry Eichengreen, and Mark P. Taylor, eds. Modern Perspectives on the Gold Standard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Bernanke, Ben, and Harold James. "The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison." In Financial Market and Financial Crises, edited by R. Glenn Hubbard, 33-68. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Bett, Virgil M. Central Banking in Mexico: Monetary Policies and Financial Crises, 1864-1940. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1957.
Bloomfield, Arthur I. Monetary Policy under the International Gold Standard, 1880 1914. New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1959.
Bloomfield, Arthur I. Short-Term Capital Movements Under the Pre-1914 Gold Standard. Princeton: International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1963.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941. Washington, DC, 1943.
Bordo, Michael D. "The Classical Gold Standard: Some Lessons for Today." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 63, no. 5 (1981): 2-17.
Bordo, Michael D. "The Classical Gold Standard: Lessons from the Past." In The International Monetary System: Choices for the Future, edited by Michael B. Connolly, 229-65. New York: Praeger, 1982.
Bordo, Michael D. "Gold Standard: Theory." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance, vol. 2, edited by Peter Newman, Murray Milgate, and John Eatwell, 267 71. London: Macmillan, 1992.
Bordo, Michael D. "The Gold Standard, Bretton Woods and Other Monetary Regimes: A Historical Appraisal." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 75, no. 2 (1993): 123-91.
Bordo, Michael D. The Gold Standard and Related Regimes: Collected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Bordo, Michael D., and Forrest Capie, eds. Monetary Regimes in Transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Bordo, Michael D., and Barry Eichengreen, eds. A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Bordo, Michael D., and Finn E. Kydland. "The Gold Standard as a Rule: An Essay in Exploration." Explorations in Economic History 32, no. 4 (1995): 423-64.
Bordo, Michael D., and Hugh Rockoff. "The Gold Standard as a 'Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval'. " Journal of Economic History 56, no. 2 (1996): 389- 428.
Bordo, Michael D., and Anna J. Schwartz, eds. A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Bordo, Michael D., and Anna J. Schwartz. "The Operation of the Specie Standard: Evidence for Core and Peripheral Countries, 1880-1990." In Currency Convertibility: The Gold Standard and Beyond, edited by Jorge Braga de Macedo, Barry Eichengreen, and Jaime Reis, 11-83. London: Routledge, 1996.
Bordo, Michael D., and Anna J. Schwartz. "Monetary Policy Regimes and Economic Performance: The Historical Record." In Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1A, edited by John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, 149-234. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1999.
Broadberry, S. N., and N. F. R. Crafts, eds. Britain in the International Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Brown, William Adams, Jr. The International Gold Standard Reinterpreted, 1914- 1934. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940.
Bureau of the Mint. Monetary Units and Coinage Systems of the Principal Countries of the World, 1929. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1929.
Cairncross, Alec, and Barry Eichengreen. Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations of 1931, 1949 and 1967. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
Calleo, David P. "The Historiography of the Interwar Period: Reconsiderations." In Balance of Power or Hegemony: The Interwar Monetary System, edited by Benjamin M. Rowland, 225-60. New York: New York University Press, 1976.
Clarke, Stephen V. O. Central Bank Cooperation: 1924-31. New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1967.
Cleveland, Harold van B. "The International Monetary System in the Interwar Period." In Balance of Power or Hegemony: The Interwar Monetary System, edited by Benjamin M. Rowland, 1-59. New York: New York University Press, 1976.
Cooper, Richard N. "The Gold Standard: Historical Facts and Future Prospects." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1982): 1-45.
Dam, Kenneth W. The Rules of the Game: Reform and Evolution in the International Monetary System. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
De Cecco, Marcello. The International Gold Standard. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
De Cecco, Marcello. "Gold Standard." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance, vol. 2, edited by Peter Newman, Murray Milgate, and John Eatwell, 260 66. London: Macmillan, 1992.
De Cecco, Marcello. "Central Bank Cooperation in the Inter-War Period: A View from the Periphery." In International Monetary Systems in Historical Perspective, edited by Jaime Reis, 113-34. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1995.
De Macedo, Jorge Braga, Barry Eichengreen, and Jaime Reis, eds. Currency Convertibility: The Gold Standard and Beyond. London: Routledge, 1996.
Ding, Chiang Hai. "A History of Currency in Malaysia and Singapore." In The Monetary System of Singapore and Malaysia: Implications of the Split Currency, edited by J. Purcal, 1-9. Singapore: Stamford College Press, 1967.
Director of the Mint. The Monetary Systems of the Principal Countries of the World, 1913. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913.
Director of the Mint. Monetary Systems of the Principal Countries of the World, 1916. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917.
Dos Santos, Fernando Teixeira. "Last to Join the Gold Standard, 1931." In Currency Convertibility: The Gold Standard and Beyond, edited by Jorge Braga de Macedo, Barry Eichengreen, and Jaime Reis, 182-203. London: Routledge, 1996.
Dowd, Kevin, and Richard H. Timberlake, Jr., eds. Money and the National State: The Financial Revolution, Government and the World Monetary System. New Brunswick (U.S.): Transaction, 1998.
Drummond, Ian. M. The Gold Standard and the International Monetary System, 1900 1939. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1987.
Easton, H. T. Tate's Modern Cambist. London: Effingham Wilson, 1912.
Eichengreen, Barry, ed. The Gold Standard in Theory and History. New York: Methuen, 1985.
Eichengreen, Barry. Elusive Stability: Essays in the History of International Finance, 1919-1939. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Eichengreen, Barry. "International Monetary Instability between the Wars: Structural Flaws or Misguided Policies?" In The Evolution of the International Monetary System: How can Efficiency and Stability Be Attained? edited by Yoshio Suzuki, Junichi Miyake, and Mitsuaki Okabe, 71-116. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990.
Eichengreen, Barry. Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919 1939. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Eichengreen, Barry. "The Endogeneity of Exchange-Rate Regimes." In Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open Economy, edited by Peter B. Kenen, 3-33. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Eichengreen, Barry. "History of the International Monetary System: Implications for Research in International Macroeconomics and Finance." In The Handbook of International Macroeconomics, edited by Frederick van der Ploeg, 153-91. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1994.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Marc Flandreau. The Gold Standard in Theory and History, second edition. London: Routledge, 1997.
Einzig, Paul. International Gold Movements. London: Macmillan, 1929. Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues, 1928-1936.
Ford, A. G. The Gold Standard 1880-1914: Britain and Argentina. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
Ford, A. G. "Notes on the Working of the Gold Standard before 1914." In The Gold Standard in Theory and History, edited by Barry Eichengreen, 141-65. New York: Methuen, 1985.
Ford, A. G. "International Financial Policy and the Gold Standard, 1870-1914." In The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 8, edited by Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard, 197-249. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Frieden, Jeffry A. "The Dynamics of International Monetary Systems: International and Domestic Factors in the Rise, Reign, and Demise of the Classical Gold Standard." In Coping with Complexity in the International System, edited by Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, 137-62. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993.
Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University, Press, 1963.
Gallarotti, Giulio M. The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime: The Classical Gold Standard, 1880-1914. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Giovannini, Alberto. "Bretton Woods and its Precursors: Rules versus Discretion in the History of International Monetary Regimes." In A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform, edited by Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen, 109-47. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Gunasekera, H. A. de S. From Dependent Currency to Central Banking in Ceylon: An Analysis of Monetary Experience, 1825-1957. London: G. Bell, 1962.
Hawtrey, R. G. The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice, fifth edition. London: Longmans, Green, 1947.
Hawtrey, R. G. Currency and Credit, fourth edition. London: Longmans, Green, 1950.
Hershlag, Z. Y. Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East. London: E. J. Brill, 1980.
Ingram, James C. Economic Changes in Thailand, 1850-1970. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1971.
Jonung, Lars. "Swedish Experience under the Classical Gold Standard, 1873-1914." In A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931, edited by Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz, 361-99. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Kemmerer, Donald L. "Statement." In Gold Reserve Act Amendments, Hearings, U.S. Senate, 83rd Cong., second session, pp. 299-302. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1954.
Kemmerer, Edwin Walter. Modern Currency Reforms: A History and Discussion of Recent Currency Reforms in India, Puerto Rico, Philippine Islands, Straits Settlements and Mexico. New York: Macmillan, 1916.
Kemmerer, Edwin Walter. Inflation and Revolution: Mexico's Experience of 1912- 1917. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940.
Kemmerer, Edwin Walter. Gold and the Gold Standard: The Story of Gold Money - - Past, Present and Future. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1944.
Kenwood, A.G., and A. L. Lougheed. The Growth of the International Economy, 1820 1960. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971.
Kettell, Brian. Gold. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982.
Kindleberger, Charles P. A Financial History of Western Europe. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984.
Kindleberger, Charles P. The World in Depression, 1929-1939, revised edition. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986.
Lampe, John R. The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century. London: Croom Helm, 1986.
League of Nations. Memorandum on Currency and Central Banks, 1913-1925, second edition, vol. 1. Geneva, 1926.
League of Nations. International Statistical Yearbook, 1926. Geneva, 1927.
League of Nations. International Statistical Yearbook, 1928. Geneva, 1929.
League of Nations. Statistical Yearbook, 1930/31.Geneva, 1931.
League of Nations. Money and Banking, 1937/38, vol. 1: Monetary Review. Geneva.
League of Nations. The Course and Control of Inflation. Geneva, 1946.
Lindert, Peter H. Key Currencies and Gold, 1900-1913. Princeton: International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1969.
McCloskey, Donald N., and J. Richard Zecher. "How the Gold Standard Worked, 1880 1913." In The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments, edited by Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry G. Johnson, 357-85. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976.
MacKay, R. A., ed. Newfoundland: Economic Diplomatic, and Strategic Studies. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946.
MacLeod, Malcolm. Kindred Countries: Canada and Newfoundland before Confederation. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1994.
Moggridge, D. E. British Monetary Policy, 1924-1931: The Norman Conquest of $4.86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
Moggridge, D. E. "The Gold Standard and National Financial Policies, 1919-39." In The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 8, edited by Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard, 250-314. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Morgenstern, Oskar. International Financial Transactions and Business Cycles. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
Norman, John Henry. Complete Guide to the World's Twenty-nine Metal Monetary Systems. New York: G. P. Putnam, 1892.
Nurkse, Ragnar. International Currency Experience: Lessons of the Inter-War Period. Geneva: League of Nations, 1944.
Officer, Lawrence H. Between the Dollar-Sterling Gold Points: Exchange Rates, Parity, and Market Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Pablo, Martín Acena, and Jaime Reis, eds. Monetary Standards in the Periphery: Paper, Silver and Gold, 1854-1933. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000.
Palyi, Melchior. The Twilight of Gold, 1914-1936: Myths and Realities. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972.
Pamuk, Sevket. A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Pani?, M. European Monetary Union: Lessons from the Classical Gold Standard. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
Powell, James. A History of the Canadian Dollar. Ottawa: Bank of Canada, 1999.
Redish, Angela. Bimetallism: An Economic and Historical Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Rifaat, Mohammed Ali. The Monetary System of Egypt: An Inquiry into its History and Present Working. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1935.
Rockoff, Hugh. "Gold Supply." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance, vol. 2, edited by Peter Newman, Murray Milgate, and John Eatwell, 271 73. London: Macmillan, 1992.
Sayers, R. S. The Bank of England, 1891-1944, Appendixes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Sayers, R. S. The Bank of England, 1891-1944. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Schwartz, Anna J. "Alternative Monetary Regimes: The Gold Standard." In Alternative Monetary Regimes, edited by Colin D. Campbell and William R. Dougan, 44-72. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
Shinjo, Hiroshi. History of the Yen: 100 Years of Japanese Money-Economy. Kobe: Kobe University, 1962.
Spalding, William F. Tate's Modern Cambist. London: Effingham Wilson, 1926.
Spalding, William F. Dictionary of the World's Currencies and Foreign Exchange. London: Isaac Pitman, 1928.
Triffin, Robert. The Evolution of the International Monetary System: Historical Reappraisal and Future Perspectives. Princeton: International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1964.
Triffin, Robert. Our International Monetary System: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. New York: Random House, 1968.
Wallich, Henry Christopher. Monetary Problems of an Export Economy: The Cuban Experience, 1914-1947. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950.
Yeager, Leland B. International Monetary Relations: Theory, History, and Policy, second edition. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.
Young, John Parke. Central American Currency and Finance. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925.